Turkey and Qatar respond to the war against Iran 

Following the outbreak of hostilities between the United States, Israel and Iran on February 28, 2026, Iran launched missile strikes against liquefied natural gas production facilities in Qatar on March 18, in response to an Israeli strike on the South Pars gas field. On March 19, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan arrived in Doha following a meeting with Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar. He called Israel the root cause of the war at a press conference, describing Iran’s attacks on countries in the region as " unacceptable, " considering them just as unlawful as actions directed against Iran itself, and emphasized that Turkey consistently supports “brotherly Qatar.”

“Turkey and Qatar are two brotherly nations that are overcoming difficult challenges thanks to their unwavering solidarity.  We will continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with the same determination, just as we have done through every trial thus far,” noted Fidan, who had already made “solidarity visits” to the country between May and July of this year, amid ongoing regional conflicts, including military operations conducted on Qatari territory.  In an interview with Katar TV during his July visit, Fidan highlighted Doha’s diplomatic and mediation efforts to resolve the regional crisis, noting that “The security and peace, as well as the security and stability of the region, are in Turkey’s interest.” In April, Yaşar Güler, Turkey’s Minister of National Defense, paid an official visit to Qatar and addressed the personnel at a local Turkish military base: “Your presence here provides reassurance to our friends and strengthens the solidarity and shared security understanding between our two countries.” Alongside this “crisis diplomacy” at the ministerial level, Turkish President Erdogan visited Doha in July to offer his condolences on the passing of Qatar’s former Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani. In his condolence message, Erdogan referred to the former emir as “a very close friend of his.”

Turkish President R. T. Erdogan meets with Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani during a condolence visit. Doha, 2026 

Amid these events and the latest cycle of regional tensions, relations between Turkey and Qatar stood out as particularly distinctive and multifaceted. This is evidenced by political terms such as “friendly,” “brotherly,” and “strategic partnership.” The bilateral partnership is deepening, as evidenced not only by these events but also by the 115 agreements already signed after 11 meetings of the High-Level Strategic Partnership Council, the high-level institutional mechanism for interstate relations. Plans are to increase the number after the 12th session, which will be held in Turkey this fall. Nevertheless, in what areas does cooperation give the relationship between Ankara and Doha a strategic character, and how does this level of relationship manifest itself, not only bilaterally, but also in the context of regional developments?

Turkey’s President R. T. Erdogan and the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, preside over the 8th meeting of the Strategic Committee: Istanbul, 2022.

Strategic partnership formation and logic   

The Turkish Foreign Ministry’s prompt and measured response to the security threats that arose in the spring of 2026 made it possible to achieve several objectives: through high-level visits, Ankara demonstrated its presence in the Persian Gulf, and statements that, albeit not harsh, clearly articulated the country’s position created the impression of political “backing” for Doha. At the same time, however, Ankara didn’t allow the military presence and solidarity with Doha to be perceived as a factor or stance directed against Iran. Of course, this was in its interest. Although Turkey announced four times in March that NATO neutralized missiles launched from Iran in its airspace, it continued to take a measured approach, seeking not only to avoid being drawn into the war but also to prevent its escalation, since such a scenario would have entailed serious complications for the country. This also aligned with Doha’s policy: faced with attacks from its long-standing and close partner, Tehran, Doha was forced to align itself more openly with the anti-Iranian front of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), while seeking to avoid a new confrontation. By supporting Qatar’s mediation efforts, Ankara also sought to prevent military escalation from undermining its strategic partner's diplomatic weight; furthermore, it positioned itself as a supporter of mediation initiatives led by Pakistan and Qatar.
The “harmonious” nature of interaction between Turkey and Qatar, emerging amid Ankara’s highly active regional diplomacy, signaled the state of bilateral relations. By acting this way, Ankara was not only responding to immediate challenges, but also building long-term political capital ahead of the emergence of a new regional order after the war, at a time when deepening its partnership with Qatar could only strengthen its position.  

“Arab Spring” and strategic convergence (2010–2014)

Until 2010-2011, relations between Turkey and Qatar were cordial but were limited primarily to economic cooperation. Moreover, these economic ties were part of broader relations between Ankara and the GCC, which developed within the framework of the high-level strategic dialogue mechanism established following the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in Jeddah in 2008. Sunni Turkey became the GCC’s first strategic dialogue partner from outside the Persian Gulf region, a status granted in part to counterbalance Shiite Iran’s role in the region. 

Ankara-Doha relations were shaped by proactive foreign policy, aligned approaches to regional issues, and shared religious and ideological views. It is generally accepted that areas of convergence in the parties’ foreign policies began to emerge in the early 2000s. On the one hand, Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa, who came to power in Qatar in 1995, pursued an active foreign policy, seeking to free the country from its dependence on Saudi Arabia in the area of security and to increase Doha’s diplomatic influence by using “soft power” and acting as a mediator (hakam) in regional conflicts. On the other hand, after the Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by Erdogan, came to power in 2002, Ahmet Davutoğlu, as the architect of the country’s foreign policy, developed the concept of “strategic depth”, “zero problems” with neighbors,  and Neo-Ottomanism, seeking to establish Ankara’s presence in the Middle East as a significant player.  

Visits by Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and President Abdullah Gül to Doha in 2008 played an important role in strengthening Turkish-Qatari relations. However, the events that have unfolded in the region since 2010, along with the foreign policy courses chosen by the parties, have created the conditions for transforming simple economic ties into strategic relations. Shortly after the outbreak of revolutionary movements in Tunisia, and subsequently in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Iraq, in late 2010, Turkey and Qatar sided with these movements (particularly those supported by the “Muslim Brotherhood”) in their confrontation against the ruling authorities. There was a mutual conviction that these revolutionary movements posed no threat to them and that, by leading the wave of change in the region, they would be able to shape a new situation in which they could play a leading role. As a result, Turkey and Qatar also found themselves at odds with regional players such as Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, which advocated for maintaining the region’s political landscape. In 2013, Egypt also joined the ranks of those countries following a successful coup against Mohamed Morsi, a representative of the Muslim Brotherhood who had come to power. 

Pressures on Qatar continued to mount, even though in 2013 the Emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa, peacefully transferred power to his son, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani,  who had the opportunity to revise his father’s policies.    

In 2013, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain recalled their ambassadors from Qatar because they viewed Doha’s support for the “Muslim Brotherhood”, which was also active in their own countries, as “interference in internal affairs.” After the crisis was resolved at an extraordinary summit in Riyadh in November 2014, a historic Turkish-Qatari agreement was signed in Ankara in December to establish a Joint High Strategic Committee, aimed at expanding and developing cooperation between the two countries in various fields. At the same time, a decision was made to establish a Turkish military base in Qatar. The deal was mutually beneficial: Doha, which had previously built its entire security architecture around U.S. protection (Al Udeid Air Base) and the collective security framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), received “guarantees of security and sovereignty” at a time when Washington was no longer inclined to intervene in the internal disputes of Arab monarchies, while Doha itself faced threats due to its pursuit of an independent foreign policy. Meanwhile, for the first time since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey asserted its presence in the strategically important Persian Gulf region, becoming a “stakeholder” and “player” in regional security, while  Ankara gained access to Qatar’s vast financial and economic resources. 

Second Gulf diplomatic crisis (2017-2021). Partnership test

The Turkey-Qatar strategic partnership was “baptized” in 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt not only cut diplomatic ties with Qatar but also closed their land, sea, and air borders, subjecting the country to economic and political isolation. The main charges amounted to “propaganda aimed at destabilizing the internal situation,” “financing terrorism,” and “close ties with Iran” in their countries. Back in July, the “Arabian quartet” issued an ultimatum to Qatar, demanding that it shut down the Turkish military base under construction and cease military cooperation (a demand that the Turkish side viewed as interference in bilateral relations), downgrade diplomatic relations with Iran, shut down the Al Jazeera network, and sever ties to “terrorist, sectarian and ideological” organizations, in particular, the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic State, Al-Qaida, Fateh al-Sham (previously Al-Nusra Front), and the Lebanese Hezbollah. Doha rejected the demands, viewing them as an encroachment on its sovereignty. 

Ankara’s reaction was neutral at first, but a few days later it sided with Qatar: two days after the blockade began, on June 7, the Turkish parliament and the president the following day urgently ratified a law authorizing the deployment of Turkish troops in Qatar. The deployment of a large Turkish military contingent to Qatar over the course of several days helped eliminate the threat of intervention by the “Arab Quartet.”  Turkey began delivering food and other essential goods to Qatar daily, using Iranian airspace and sea routes. From June through September, Turkish exports to Qatar nearly doubled, reaching $216 million (compared to $114 million in 2016).


Turkey sent stockpiles of food and water supplies aboard cargo planes to Qatar: Doha, 2017

The blockade, which lasted more than 3.5 years, ultimately failed, in part thanks to support from Turkey, because Doha failed to meet any of the 13 demands imposed on it. On January 5, 2021, during the GCC summit in the Saudi city of Al-Ula, a reconciliation agreement with Qatar was signed, the blockade was lifted, diplomatic and economic ties were restored, and the borders were opened. 

Before the 2016 blockade, Qatar was among the first to condemn the attempted military coup in Turkey and express solidarity with Erdogan. Furthermore, during periods of economic hardship in Turkey, such as the U.S. sanctions imposed on Ankara following the arrest of Andrew Brunson in 2018, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the 2023 earthquake, financial and economic support from Qatar has also helped strengthen diplomatic relations between the two sides.   

Institutionalization of relationships

In the period following the agreement signing in Al-Ula and through 2026, Turkish-Qatari relations were characterized by efforts aimed at deepening and institutionalizing ties. Despite predictions that normalizing relations with the quartet would weaken Ankara-Doha ties, recent years have shown that these ties are strong and go beyond mere “support during a crisis.” Reconciliation with Doha, in turn, didn’t hinder but facilitated the normalization of relations between the quartet countries (the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt) and Ankara. During this period, the agenda for bilateral political relations advanced through annual meetings of the Strategic Committee, convened at the leaders’ level. 

The two sides also cooperated in third countries: after the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in 2021, Ankara and Doha conducted a joint operation to ensure the continued operation of Kabul International Airport and to facilitate dialogue between Western nations and the Taliban; regarding the crisis in the Gaza Strip, they have adopted a unified approach, acting as mediators in negotiations with the political wing of Hamas and proposing initiatives for a ceasefire. 

Contradictions

Over the years, the two countries have had conflicting interests on several issues. Examples include a 2016 deal in which Qatar’s state-owned oil and gas company, in partnership with ExxonMobil, obtained a license to drill in the disputed Block 10 off the coast of Cyprus (which drew criticism from Ankara), or Al Jazeera’s  pro-Kurdish coverage of Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring in northern Syria in 2019, a move that the pro-government Turkish newspaper Sabah called a “stab in the back.” However,  such disagreements were generally resolved quickly.     

Security and  defense cooperation

As part of the ambitious regional policy adopted in Turkey after the AKP came to power, military power, which served as one of the tools for implementing the policy, gradually took on enormous significance. As a result of efforts aimed at developing the defense sector, Turkey’s security concept changed: the country began to act not merely as a “consumer” of security but also as a “provider” of it. This transition was also achieved through the establishment of a military presence abroad, which first took the form of a military base in Qatar. 

Following the signing of an agreement between Turkey and Qatar in the early 2000s on cooperation in the fields of security and law enforcement (covering the fight against terrorism, smuggling, and organized crime), the first significant step in the purely military sphere was the signing of a treaty on educational, technical and scientific cooperation in the military sphere on May 23, 2007. The cooperation agreements on military education and the defense industry signed in 2012 already signaled a new, higher level of cooperation.  

On December 19, 2014, a cooperation agreement was signed on military education, the defense industry, and the stationing of Turkish armed forces in Qatar, which was ratified in Turkey in the spring of 2015. Turkey participated in the “Nasr” joint military exercises, which took place in Qatar from October 17 to 29, 2015. For that purpose, the 100 Turkish military personnel in Qatar did not return after the exercises ended, and thus the first Turkish military elements began operating in Doha. Thus, exactly a century later, the Turkish military returned to Qatar, a significant symbolic event. It should be noted that the Ottoman forces had left Qatar in 1915. On April 28, 2016, the day the agreement was signed to implement the arrangements regarding the deployment of Turkish armed forces in Qatar, Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu announced that the Turkish military base was, in effect, beginning operations. The station was established for a term of ten years, with the possibility of extension if neither party objected, a provision whose practical implications became evident ten years later.
From 2015 to 2017, the Turkish military presence in Doha was limited to a small number of service members stationed at the Tariq bin Ziyad military base, and their activities focused on training and advisory missions. However, during the 2017 crisis, the Turkish side reinforced its existing forces within a very short timeframe. In November 2019, a new, large-scale military complex for the Turkey-Qatar Joint Forces Command (Türkiye-Katar Birleşik Müşterek Kuvvet Komutanlığı), also known as the Khalid ibn al-Walid barracks, officially opened. The military base can accommodate up to 5000 soldiers. However, according to the 2025 report “The Military Balance,” prepared by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, there are 300 Turkish servicemen in Doha. The same report states that the total number of Turkish armed forces and personnel stationed abroad is 42,000-42,500, including those in the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (about 33,800). According to information cited in an article by journalist Murat Yetkin, published in the Turkish YetkinReport, citing sources within defense agencies, the number of Turkish Armed Forces stationed abroad reaches 70,000. According to the 2014 edition of “The Military Balance,” Qatar’s active military strength was 11,800 before the base was established and reached 16,500 in 2025.

The defense industry is a key area of cooperation between the two countries in security and defense field; the aforementioned agreements of 2007, 2012 and 2014 served as the foundation for its development. The scope of cooperation is defined primarily by Qatari investments in Turkey’s defense industry, as well as by Turkish arms exports to Qatar.  

In 2014, 49% of the shares in the Turkish automaker BMC (BMC Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret) were transferred to the Qatar Armed Forces Investment Company (QAFIC) for $300 million, and in 2018, the company won the tender for the mass production of Turkey’s national main battle tank, the Altay. In 2019, by a decision of the Turkish president, the tank repair factory in Sakarya, owned by the Turkish Armed Forces, was transferred to BMC for a period of 25 years, on the condition that the company invests $50 million. In 2019, it was announced that Doha had placed an order for 100 tanks. Qatar’s Minister of Defense also attended the official handover ceremony for the first Altay tank to the Turkish Armed Forces on October 28, 2025. 

In 2019, six Bayraktar TB2 combat UAVs were delivered to Qatar in accordance with a contract signed between the Qatari Armed Forces and Turkish defense company Baykar during the DIMDEX 2018 maritime defense exhibition and conference. Under a 2014 agreement, the Qatar Navy received 17 high-speed patrol boats from the Turkish shipbuilder Ares in 2018. Furthermore, under a contract signed during a 2018 exhibition, the Turkish shipbuilder Anadolu built and delivered two training ships (AL DOHA և AL SHAMAL) to the Qatar Navy, as well as, under a separate or additional agreement, four landing craft. In 2017 and thereafter, contracts were signed between the Qatari company Barzan Holding and the Turkish company Nurol Makine for the delivery of approximately 500 armored vehicles (Yörük 4×4 և Ejder Yalçın) to the Qatari Army. Under an agreement reached at the DIMDEX 2018 exhibition, Aselsan (which holds a 48% stake) and Barzan Holdings (which holds a 51% stake) established a joint venture in Doha called BARQ; the agreement also provided for the exchange of technology for a range of defense products. This year, as part of the DIMDEX 2026 exhibition, the Turkish technology company STM (Savunma Teknolojileri Mühendislik ve Ticaret A.Ş.) and Barzan Holdings signed, among other agreements, a memorandum of understanding on the joint production of unmanned aerial vehicles. 

In addition to highlighting trends in the development of bilateral cooperation in this area, quantitative indicators and their consideration within a broader context are also of great importance. According to data published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 2026, Qatar ranked fifth among destinations for Turkish arms exports from 2000-2025, accounting for 5․88% of the total behind the UAE (20․52%), Saudi Arabia (12.12%), Bangladesh (8․99%) and Romania (7․83%). At the same time, Turkey ranked fourth among arms suppliers to Qatar with a 4.99% share, trailing the United States (64․89%), France (13․79%) and the United Kingdom (5.55%).  

Since 2015, the armed forces of the two countries have also frequently conducted military exercises, including the Al-Udeid and Nasr series of military exercises, among others.   

Economic cooperation

However, the strategic partnership between Turkey and Qatar is not limited to cooperation in the political, security, and defense spheres; economic independence is also one of its pillars. The institutional foundations of bilateral economic relations were laid in Turkey during Turgut Özal term as prime minister, a period marked by economic reforms. The Joint Commission on Economic and Technical Cooperation, established under the agreement of the same name, began its work in 1985. In the 2000s, the Qatari side proposed establishing a bilateral business council; in response, the Turkish side pointed out that there were not enough businesspeople (25) who had expressed interest. As a result, the council was not formed until 2006, during the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) term in office. In 2008, a Turkish-Qatari business forum was held in Doha, attended by Turkish President Gül, and a memorandum of cooperation was signed with the Qatar Investment Authority that same year. The two countries are also bound by a double taxation treaty signed in 2001 and a treaty on the protection and promotion of investments. The Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEOA), signed in 2018 and set to take force on August 1, 2025, is essentially a free trade agreement that provides for the phased elimination of customs duties, an increase in trade turnover, and the promotion of investment. In addition to its Customs Union with the EU, Turkey has free trade agreements with 23 countries, including Egypt, Georgia, and the UAE. It has preferential trade agreements with 6 countries, including Iran, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan. The document called for an increase in annual trade turnover with Qatar, which stood at $1.1 billion to $5 billion in the medium term. 

It should be noted that statistics on bilateral trade over the past ten-plus years show that it has been growing, albeit not at a linear rate. For instance, in 2016, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK), bilateral trade totaled $773 million; during the Qatar blockade, it rose sharply, reaching $1.08 billion in 2017 and $1.63 billion in 2018. The highest figure was recorded in 2022 and amounted to $2.196 billion. Nevertheless, these figures represent only a small portion of Turkey’s total foreign trade turnover. Between 2021 and 2025, Qatar’s share fluctuated between 0.18% and 0.36%, reaching a peak of 0.36% in 2022. In 2025, bilateral trade with Qatar ($1.26 billion) accounted for approximately 0.20% of Turkey’s total foreign trade ($638.640 billion). Turkey’s trade turnover with Qatar is also several times lower than its trade figures with Saudi Arabia ($7.22 billion in 2025) and the UAE ($18.95 billion in 2025). Thus, it can be argued that the defining feature of economic ties between Turkey and Qatar is not so much the exceptionally large volume of trade as their multifaceted nature and close interconnection with political and strategic relations.        
 

Economic relations between Turkey and Qatar are developing in several key sectors, such as finance, investment, infrastructure, logistics, media, and construction. Moreover, especially in recent years, economic cooperation has entailed more than just the flow of funds from Qatar to  Turkey. 

Qatari public and private capital entry into Turkey was marked by the acquisition of a stake in Alternatif Bank-ի (Abank) in 2013, followed by its full takeover in 2016. Qatar National Bank (QNB) purchased Finansbank in 2016, which at the time was Turkey’s fifth-largest private bank in terms of assets, deposits, and loan portfolio. Between 2015 and 2019, the Qatari fund Mayhoola for Investments acquired the most valuable and profitable assets of Boyner Reytail, the leader in Turkey’s apparel and luxury goods retail market, namely Beymen Mağazacılık (Turkey’s largest chain of luxury and international brand clothing stores) and AY Marka Mağazacılık (which included the brands Network, Divarese, Que). This transaction marked the largest foreign investment to date in Turkey’s luxury goods and fashion retail sector. In July 2015, the newly formed beIN Media Group, created as a result of the restructuring of Al Jazeera Sport, acquired Turkey’s largest digital pay -TV platform and satellite broadcaster, Digiturk, for more than $1 billion, according to some estimates. The platform had about $3.3 million subscribers, and its key asset was the broadcasting rights to the Turkish football championship. In October 2020, the Qatari port operator QTerminals acquired the right to operate the Port of Antalya (Port Akdeniz) until 2028 from the Turkish company Global Ports Holding for $140 million. The deal expanded Qatari capital's presence in Turkey’s Mediterranean logistics infrastructure. Investments were made in the defense industry (BMC), tourism, and other fields. It is noteworthy that in August 2018, amid the depreciation of the Turkish lira caused by tensions in relations between Turkey and the United States, the central banks of the two countries entered into a swap agreement for an amount equivalent to $3 billion (in Turkish lira and Qatari riyals), which enabled Turkey to stabilize its national currency. On November 25, 2019, the swap volume was increased to $5 billion, and on May 20, 2020,  to $15 billion. Qatar’s humanitarian, financial, and political support became evident during the 2023 earthquake in Turkey, as well as during the run-up to the parliamentary and presidential elections held the same year. This, along with other operations, highlights the multifaceted nature of Qatar’s economic presence in Turkey.   

According to data released by Turkey’s Ministry of Industry and Technology, citing the Central Bank, direct investment from Qatar to Turkey peaked in 2019, reaching $570 million. Between 2002 and 2026, Qatar’s direct investment in Turkey totaled $3,479 million, accounting for 1.7% of total direct investment in Turkey. In terms of this indicator, Qatar ranks behind a number of European countries, as well as Azerbaijan, the UAE, Russia and Japan. 

In 2023, Turkey’s Minister of Trade, Ömer Bolat, reported that there were 220 Qatari companies operating in Turkey and that investments exceeded $20 billion, likely including not only direct investments but also portfolio and other investment figures in this calculation. In his speech, Bolat, while also discussing Turkish investments in Qatar, mentioned the operations of 727 Turkish companies in Qatar. In August 2026, Bolat stated that there were 1116 companies, with construction, services and manufacturing listed as their main areas of activity. 

It should be noted that Turkish construction companies began entering the Qatari market in the early 2000s, but their presence gained momentum after 2010, when Qatar was awarded the rights to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup, and in 2008 adopted the Qatar National Vision 2030, which called for major infrastructure transformations in the country. Bolat stated in the aforementioned speech that Turkish companies have completed about 206 projects in Qatar worth $21 billion in the contracting sector. The partnership between the Turkish company BOTAŞ and the Qatar Energy company in the field of liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports was of great importance not only for Turkey’s economy but also for its geopolitical security, allowing Ankara to diversify its gas import sources. Although the contract for purchasing liquefied natural gas from Qatar was terminated in 2023 (it is currently imported from the United States, Algeria, and other countries), the infrastructure built for this purpose between 2015 and 2023, such as terminals, was crucial to Turkey’s future success. 

Thus, a distinctive feature of Turkish-Qatari economic relations is their asymmetrical nature: the volume of bilateral trade is relatively limited not only compared to Turkey’s total foreign trade, but also compared to trade with its Arab partners in the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, Qatar’s economic presence in Turkey and the activities of Turkish companies in Qatar are concentrated in key economic sectors.   

Religious and ideological commonalities 

In political analyses of Turkish-Qatari relations, it is often noted that the peoples of the two countries are united by “deep-rooted historical ties, built on political, social, and religious foundations.” In both countries, the majority of the population follows the Sunni branch of Islam: in Turkey, followers of the Hanafi school of Islamic law predominate, while in Qatar, followers of the Wahhabi movement, associated with the Hanbali school of Islamic law (mazhab), predominate. It is important to note that Wahhabism is the foundational religious movement of the Saudi state. However, Qatar’s “maritime Wahhabism” differs from Saudi Arabia’s “desert Wahhabism” in that it emphasizes tolerance and a more lenient approach toward followers of other branches of Islam, including Shiites. This circumstance explains Qatar’s open policy toward the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization founded in Egypt by the Islamic politician Hassan al-Banna, and its members, the Ikhwāns (brothers), who began seeking refuge in Doha after being expelled in the 1950s and 1960s. In addition, personal ties have developed between the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar’s ruling elite. For example, the Egyptian theologian and one of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, maintained close ties with the Al Thani family. Qaradawi’s influence in Qatar extended to the education and media sectors, including religious programs broadcast on the Al Jazeera TV channel. Turkey’s Justice and Development Party also maintains warm relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, which emerged on the political scene following a split within the National Perspective (Milli Görüş) party, one of Turkey’s Islamic political movements. The development of ties between Necmettin Erbakan, the founder and leader of the National Perspective party and Ihvan also began in the 1950s. Along with political and pragmatic considerations and interests, these religious and ideological foundations explain the positions taken by Turkey and Qatar during the Arab Spring. However, it is important to note that the resolution of disputes, which began with  Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, especially after the Al-Ula Declaration, has prompted Turkey and Qatar to exercise greater caution on issues related to support for the Muslim Brotherhood.   

The ideological similarities between the two countries are much broader. Thus, the young Turkish researcher Nesibe Hicret  Battaloglu, analyzing the perception of national roles in Turkey’s foreign policy, primarily based on the “role theory” developed in the works of Canadian political scientist Kalevi Holsti, identifies 5 national roles in Ankara’s official discourse on relations with Qatar: 

• regional leader, 
• regional protector, 
• defender of Islam, 
• faithful ally,
• resisting-rejecting-reconstituting actor.

These roles show how ideological concepts are transformed into practical behavior in foreign policy, and how generalizations are transformed into factors. Ankara’s statement that it does not view Qatar’s security and stability as separate from its own demonstrates its strong commitment to taking on responsibility in regional processes. During the 2017 crisis, the military-political, economic, and humanitarian support for Qatar as a “regional defender” or, as it was often described, a “defender of the oppressed”, as well as the emphasis in official discourse on the fact that the blockade of a Muslim country, especially during the holy month of Ramadan, is problematic and contrary to Islamic values, were manifestations of Ankara’s policy as a “defender of Islam.” Responding quickly to the 2017 crisis, Turkey demonstrated its “loyalty” to Qatar, which was among the first to condemn Turkey during the “difficult days” of the attempted military coup in 2016. And the “role of the resisting-rejecting-reconstituting”, as formulated by Battaloglu himself, refers to Ankara’s pursuit of autonomy from the superpowers (resistance), its criticism of the existing power structure in international relations (rejection), and its support for the formation of a new regional/global order (reconstitution). A striking example of this is Erdogan’s slogan: “the world is bigger than five.” There is a significant ideological overlap between the two countries on this issue, as Doha also often criticizes the international system for being weak and unjust. Both countries share the belief that people have the right to resist tyranny, coups, and injustice.  

Conclusion

An analysis of Turkish-Qatar relations shows that four main factors determine their strategic nature. First, the political factor: regional upheavals of the 2010s, particularly the “ Arab Spring” and the 2017 blockade of Qatar, brought Ankara and Doha closer together, establishing a pattern of mutual political support and solidarity amid external and internal pressure. Second is the security and defense factor, the most institutionalized aspect of partnership: the Turkish military presence in Qatar, periodic joint exercises, arms transfers, and defense-industrial cooperation have created, at the very least, a medium-term relationship. Third is the economic factor, characterized not by a large volume of bilateral trade, but by the concentration of Qatari investments and the activities of Turkish companies in key sectors: finance, infrastructure, logistics, construction, media, and the defense industry. Fourth, the religious and ideological factor: with predominantly Sunni Muslim populations and a shared historical past, the two countries have built a close relationship based on a common approach to regional developments and the international system. At the same time, religious and ideological similarities were complemented by pragmatic interests. 

Overall, the nature of Turkish-Qatari relations can be described as multifaceted interdependence based on mutual interests: for Qatar, Turkey serves as an additional source of security and political support, while for Turkey, Qatar is an important partner in strengthening its military, political and economic presence in the Persian Gulf. New regional tensions that emerged between the 2017 crisis and 2026 indicate that this interdependence has gradually moved beyond situational solidarity and taken on a long-term and institutionalized character.