Over the past few years, Turkey’s political system has undergone profound transformations. Although the presidential election is scheduled for 2028, domestic political developments, especially within the opposition, have made the possibility of early elections not only a theoretical debate but also an integral part of the current political agenda. Currently, the focus remains on the legal case involving the detained former opposition Mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoğlu, his legal status, and the impact of all this on the future of the Turkish opposition movement. At the same time, questions about a possible change in power, constitutional limits and the future of the current president provide a broader context for these processes.

According to Turkish law, a Turkish citizen who is at least 40 years old, holds a college degree, and is eligible to be elected to parliament may run for president. Although this is a legal requirement, in the current situation it has acquired considerable political significance.  

On March 18, 2025, Istanbul University revoked Imamoğlu’s bachelor’s degree and on July 24, it revoked his master’s degree. These decisions have created a legal obstacle for Imamoğlu in terms of his ability to run for president, while other cases previously filed against him are currently pending in court. 

In previous years Imamoğlu had already stated his willingness to run in the upcoming presidential election. Since then, his political activity, public support and electoral successes have made him one of the strongest challengers to current President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 

There is a widespread belief among the opposition that the annulment of Imamoğlu’s degrees, along with allegations of corruption and ties to terrorist organizations, are aimed at undermining public trust in him and limiting his chances of being elected. In other words, legal and administrative measures were implemented to regulate the competitive environment.   

The situation surrounding Imamoğlu can be viewed from three perspectives: 

1. Political competition: He is considered one of Erdoğan’s main rivals. His election victories in major cities have shown that the ruling party can lose even in its traditional strongholds.
    
2. Ability to influence the masses/ public speaking skills: – Both Erdoğan and Imamoğlu are masterful orators and are capable of influencing broad segments of society, thereby gaining widespread support. 
3. Warning signal: His detention and prosecution are seen as a message to other opposition figures who might be considering a run for president. 

Thus, the trial became a political symbol: for the opposition, Imamoğlu came to represent the limitations of the electoral system. 

Turkey’s main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), finds itself in a rather difficult situation. CHP Chairman Özgür Özel stated in an interview with a Turkish TV channel last December that Imamoğlu remains their “Plan A and Plan Z”.  At the same time, there is a widespread view in political circles that if the election is held under the current legal framework, Imamoğlu will not be able to run for office due to legal issues related to his degree. This poses a practical problem for the CHP when selecting a new candidate. 

Among the potential candidates, Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş is frequently mentioned; he consistently ranks highly in opinion polls and may also be able to attract support from a segment of the conservative electorate. However, there are concerns that he, too, may be subject to pressure. 

The names of Adana Mayor Zeydan Karalar and Mayor of Mersin Vahap Seçer are also being discussed, but their political influence is comparatively much less significant. 

Mehmet Ali Kulat, head of the public opinion research division at the consulting firm MAK, stated that Özgür Özel could ultimately become the Republican People’s Party’s candidate. However, this scenario has not been officially confirmed, indicating uncertainty within the opposition camp. It is also possible that the main opposition party is deliberately maintaining an uncertainty surrounding its candidate. 

Former President Abdullah Gül had previously been mentioned as a possible “consensus” candidate, but he has publicly denied these claims.  

Erdogan’s future and constitutional scenarios  

Erdoğan has been in power longer than any other Turkish leader, since 2003. Erdogan has been in power longer than even Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey. 

Turkish media have regularly reported on Erdoğan’s health issues, although there has been no official confirmation. The decline in his health during the 2023 election campaign intensified the debate on the issue. Ahead of the Turkish local elections on March 31, 2024, Erdoğan stated that these would be his “last elections.” However, the constitutional provisions that have been in force since 2018, which limit the presidency to two terms, also contain mechanisms that could open the door for a third presidential term. 

Although Erdoğan stated in 2025 that he was not interested in running for re-election, he did not rule out the possibility if the “people wanted it.”

From a constitutional standpoint, several  mechanisms could theoretically allow Erdoğan to extend his rule:

• a constitutional amendment revising  the term of office,
   
• a parliamentary decision to hold early elections,
   
• a postponement of the electoral process through legal interpretations,
   
• the declaration of a state of emergency in response to a national crisis.

It should be noted that the last two options are unlikely.  

For a constitutional amendment, it is first and foremost necessary to secure the support of 360-400 lawmakers, which is difficult for the current ruling People’s Alliance (Cumhur Ittifakı) to achieve, given that it holds only 337 seats in parliament. Article 116 of the Turkish Constitution allows Parliament to call early elections during the president’s second term, which could allow Erdoğan to run for a third term. 

According to the latest official statements and sources, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) intends to secure a parliamentary decision on early elections so that Erdoğan can run for president again in November 2027, approximately 6 months before the next scheduled elections in June 2028. To ensure a quorum, the ruling coalition will employ certain strategies to win over independent lawmakers. That scenario also envisages possible support of the pro-Kurdish oppositional People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM). It should be noted that this pro-Kurdish party has 56 seats in parliament. In this case, support from the DEM will be provided only on the condition of a political trade-off, namely the release of Selahattin Demirtaş, the former co-chair of the pro-Kurdish opposition People's Democratic Party (HDP),  who is currently in prison.

Another scenario is being circulated behind the scenes within the Turkish government: it is noted that Erdoğan will try to find an opportunity to call early elections at an appropriate moment before October 2027. According to such claims, Erdoğan will set the election date once he is confident that the odds are in his favor. However, if the polls he has commissioned and his own analysis indicate that he will lose the election, Erdoğan will demand that the government amend the constitution to return to a parliamentary system in October 2027.  

According to AKP representatives, the HDP, considered the main opposition party,  will nominate Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş as its presidential candidate. If the HDP wins, it will offer the position of prime minister to presidential candidate Ekrem Imamoğlu, who is currently in prison. 

It should be noted that if the presidency becomes vacant by 2028, the Constitution requires that new elections be held within 45 days. However, the succession process within the ruling AKP lacks clear coordination. Among the potential successors are Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Erdoğan’s son-in-law Selçuk Bayraktar, and Erdoğan’s son Bilal Erdoğan, suggesting possible rivalry within the ruling elite. 

Holding early elections in Turkey requires a parliamentary decision and political consensus, which will be difficult to achieve given the current balance of power without votes from outside the ruling bloc. Furthermore, the current president may be re-elected only if certain constitutional amendments are adopted or if Article 101 is revised (this article limits a person to a maximum of two terms as president). It should be noted that the opposition itself called for early elections. The leader of the main opposition party stated that they are ready to vote in favor of a resolution to hold early parliamentary elections at any time. Thus, the issue of early elections is not merely an opposition demand but also involves a range of constitutional complexities and political calculations. 

It should also be noted that discussions regarding the timing of early elections are linked, in part, to expectations of economic stabilization in the country (in 2026–2027).

In light of the current political situation in Turkey, several pro-government, pro-opposition and independent polling firms regularly conduct surveys to assess public opinion.  

In response to a question from the pro-government polling firm Genar, “If elections were held today, which party would you vote for?”, 34.8% of participants said they would vote for the ruling AKP, 31.5% for the main opposition party, CHP, 9.3% for the pro-Kurdish opposition party DEM, 8% for the Nationalist  Movement Party (MHP), which is considered the political wing of the Grey Wolves and another 4.7% for the opposition nationalist Good Party (İYİ). 

According to a poll conducted by the opposition research firm Gündemar, the CHP is in the lead (33.33%). 28.56% of respondents said they would vote for the ruling party. 

In response to the question, “Who would you vote for if Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş ran against each other?” the participants’ answers were distributed  as follows:

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan — 40.8%

Mansur Yavaş — 49%.

According to a poll by the research firm ASAL, 54.4% of respondents supported holding early elections, while 38% opposed it. 

Pro-government media in Turkey are extensively covering various examples of the political and public activities of Bilal Erdoğan, the son of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to enhance his political image. In early 2026, the number of publications about him increased by 400% compared to the same period last year.

Bilal Erdoğan has not officially stated his political ambitions, but he is seen as a potential candidate for Turkey’s future political leader, with influence over charitable and educational foundations with budgets in the millions. Due to his activity in public and media spheres, his nationwide recognition, and his connections within the administration, he can clearly position himself as Erdogan’s “successor.”

The Turkish political system is currently undergoing a period of change, in which legal and political instruments are intertwined and influence relations between the government and the opposition. The situation around Ekrem Imamoğlu (the cancellation of his diplomas and the legal proceedings against him) illustrates the legal mechanisms being used to control political competition and the tools being employed to limit the opposition’s ability to act.  

This situation poses challenges for the opposition in terms of finding a new candidate and revising its strategy. At the same time, the political reality suggests that holding early elections is becoming a more likely option than the other scenarios mentioned above. 

Overall,  these developments demonstrate that the domestic political situation in Turkey is complex and volatile, and that interrelated legal, administrative, and social factors shape the political process. Imamoğlu’s case and the debates surrounding opposition candidates are a clear example of these systemic constraints and political maneuvering, which could shape the country’s political future, particularly through early elections.