China - Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan railway

China has begun to build a new, costly and complex infrastructure project that is strengthening its geopolitical role in Central Asia. This refers to the China – Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan (CKU) railway, which has been under discussion for nearly 3 decades.  

The commencement ceremony of the China-Kyrgyzstan -Uzbekistan (CKU) railway project was held in Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan, on December 27, 2024. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov attended the event, and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Chinese President Xi Jinping sent congratulatory messages for the ceremony.

Noting that the construction of the railway reflects the shared aspiration of the three countries to open up this strategic corridor, Xi Jinping said that the commencement ceremony marks the transition of the project from conception to implementation. Xi Jinping emphasized the need for close collaboration among the relevant departments and enterprises of the three countries to ensure high standards and high-quality progress in the railway construction. According to him, all efforts should be made to build the railway into a model of cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative. 

Negotiations on the construction of the railway began long ago. The offer was put forward in 1997, in Paris, during a conference on the TRACECA  (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) project, aiming to connect the railway networks of China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan to gain access to sea routes via the infrastructure of Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and Europe. A trilateral meeting between the authorities of China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan took place in Bishkek on November 5, 1997, during which the parties agreed to establish a joint working group. Following the meeting, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the Ministry of Railways of China,  the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Kyrgyzstan and the Ministry of Transport of Uzbekistan. However, the railway’s construction was delayed for many years for various reasons.  

In 2000, the Chinese side allocated approximately $3 million for a feasibility study of the Kyrgyz section of the railway. 

In April 2005, the  “Tulip Revolution”  and the ouster of President Akayev brought the negotiations to a halt. The clashes that took place in May in the city of Andijan, Uzbekistan, are another reason for the delay in the CKU project. Despite these challenges, China began construction of the railway on its territory in the mid-2000s.   

Following the events in Andijan, the United States and the European Union issued condemnation statements, and the United Nations adopted a special resolution. According to many analysts, these moves by the West are forcing Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to draw closer to China.  

In the early 2010s,  negotiations between China and  Kyrgyzstan resumed. In May 2012, a joint meeting of the working committee and the China-Kyrgyzstan expert group was held in Beijing. In June, Chinese President Jintao and Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev once again discussed the prospects for the railway project during the SCO summit in Beijing. Since 2013, when China’s Belt and Road Initiative was announced, Kyrgyzstan began to increase the volume of Chinese investment, and negotiations on the CKU railway were once again put on the agenda. As a result, on December 19-20, 2016, the parties resumed trilateral talks in Bishkek, and on September 5, 2017, Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev and his Uzbek counterpart Shavkat Mirziyoyev discussed the issue in Bishkek. The results of the negotiations have already been set out in a memorandum dated December 2024. 

The $2.3 billion loan agreement, signed with the China Development Bank and the EximBank in Bishkek on December 16, 2025, will provide the financial basis for the project. The total cost of building the railway is estimated at $4.7 billion. Funding is structured as follows: half of the amount is provided as a 35-year soft loan, and the other half as a joint investment by the three countries: China (51%), Kyrgyzstan (24.5%) and Uzbekistan (24.5%). The project will be implemented under a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model, under which the joint venture will operate the railway until the investment is recouped, after which the Kyrgyz section will be transferred to local authorities.  

The railway will pass through rugged mountainous terrain, requiring the construction of 50 bridges and 29 tunnels (accounting for nearly 40% of the route). The most serious technical problem lies in the differences in railway gauge: China uses the European standard of 1,435 mm, while Central Asia uses the Soviet standard of  1,520 mm. As a compromise, it was decided to locate the rolling stock transfer station in the town of Makmal, deep within Kyrgyz territory. This is strategically important for Bishkek, as it enables the railway to connect the northern and southern regions of the country, thereby promoting domestic economic integration. The total length of the railway will be approximately 520 km, of which 213 km will pass through China, 304 km through Kyrgyzstan, and 50 km through Uzbekistan. The railway begins in Kashgar (China), passes through the Torugart Pass in Kyrgyzstan, reaches Jalal-Abad, and connects with Andijan, Uzbekistan. 

The China-Europe route via this route is about 1000 km shorter than the northern corridor through Russia and reduces freight transit time by about 7 days. 

The Russian-Ukrainian war and Western sanctions have also weakened Russia’s influence in Central Asia, making China an important economic partner for the region. In 2025, trade between China and Central Asia exceeded $100 billion.  

Geopolitical developments also shifted Moscow’s stance on the railway project, moving from cautious resistance to reluctant acceptance. For decades, Russia viewed this project as a threat to its geopolitical dominance and to the competing Trans-Siberian Railway. However, due to sanctions and the closure of the European market, Moscow was forced to reconsider its position.   

Thus, the construction of a project that had been under discussion for nearly three decades has begun. This project may have significant economic implications for Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, both of which face challenging geographical and infrastructure conditions. 

The China – Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan railway also presents competitive opportunities: according to some analysts, in addition to Russia, it undermines Kazakhstan’s logistical monopoly and competes with the Middle Corridor. However, we believe that the Central European Corridor could serve not as a competitor but as a complementary route to the Middle Corridor, helping to increase Chinese and Central Asian exports to Europe.  In this regard, we should also consider the war between the United States and Israel against Iran, which could temporarily disrupt the China – Central Asia – Iran routes, thereby further increasing the importance of the Middle Corridor. The launch of the CKU railway marks a strengthening of China’s role in the European region, however, the project’s ultimate success will depend on how effectively regional security issues are addressed.  

As of early 2026, Eurasia’s transport map is divided into two main southern routes, which complement each other but offer different logistics models. If the Middle Corridor is a multimodal infrastructure, then the CKU is China’s shortest land route to the West.