IMEC Project Developments

A new infrastructure project is emerging on the world economic map: the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). It is one of the most ambitious and complex undertakings in modern geopolitics. The idea is to create a fast, secure, and efficient corridor for the export of goods, energy and data, connecting India with Europe. 

IMEC aims to integrate multimodal infrastructure: alongside sea and rail routes, the corridor will include submarine and surface fiber optic cables, the production and transportation of environmentally friendly hydrogen, and multi-level transport systems. 

The project also aims to create a strategic alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, turning it into a geopolitical rivalry and reflecting a new (or perhaps already established) world order.  

Nevertheless, the path of this large-scale project is complex and filled with multilevel difficulties. The project should overcome regional tensions, reconcile the often-conflicting interests of many countries, and ensure huge public and private investments.  

Below, we will discuss developments surrounding the IMEC project, presenting them by country. 

Europe

In the IMEC founding declaration signed in September 2023, the participating countries (India, the USA, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, France, Germany, Italy, and the European Union) said the route would have two separate but interconnected corridors. The first eastern corridor provides for maritime communication between India and the Arabian Peninsula, while the second, northern corridor, is to run from the Arabian Peninsula to Europe by land. Since the very beginning, the overwhelming majority of international experts and analysts noted that the creation of IMEC was motivated not only by the desire for economic and infrastructural development but also had a clear geopolitical context: to confront China.   

Today, it is becoming increasingly evident that IMEC can become an important strategic project for Europe. Based on some estimates, the land route could reduce transport costs by up to 30% and cut transit time through the Suez Canal by 40%. These opportunities and the understanding that IMEC can balance Chinese influence put the European Union in need of concrete action. 

The European countries united around the new idea are also competing, each striving to centralize the main IMEC centers on its territory. The ports of Thessaloniki and Piraeus in Greece, Trieste in Italy, and Marseille in France each have their advantages, but perhaps Greece and Italy are in the most favorable position. Other projects may involve different roles within the project in the future.

The port of Trieste in Italy, a historic commercial hub on the Adriatic Sea coast, stands out in this competition. Since ancient Roman times, it has been an important trading hub with the Mediterranean basin, the Middle East, and even India. Currently, the port of Trieste has highly developed infrastructure, quays stretching over 10 km, capable of loading and unloading oil, specialized freight, and containers. It serves more than 15,000 trains annually. Amid the logistical crisis caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war, Trieste has become one of the key hubs of the North Adriatic, explaining its critical importance at IMEC. It is no coincidence that it is often called the gateway to the “new golden road”. 

It is noteworthy that in 2019, Italy joined China’s Belt and Road initiative, becoming the only G7 member country to join the Chinese initiative. However, in 2023, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government suspended its membership. In 2023, Italy signed a strategic cooperation program with India, and Meloni announced key cooperation between the two peninsulas: the Indian Peninsula and the Apennine Peninsula. These steps by Italy are attempts to strengthen Trieste’s role as a gateway for the India-Europe prospective corridor.       

Overall, the European Union is deepening its relations with India. Although bilateral ties have a long history, there is a growing effort to develop a strategic agenda. The EU-India summit, most likely be held in 2026, could be an important step in this direction. Initiated by the EU, such a summit could serve as a platform for the development of new joint programs in trade, technology, and security fields, thereby strengthening Europe’s role as a pillar of IMEC.   

The EU-India Strategic Agenda, adopted by the European Parliament on September 18, 2025, which refers to IMEC, is another manifestation of Europe’s interests towards India. The document states that the project seeks to revive historical Eurasian trade routes by integrating maritime, rail, energy, digital and clean hydrogen infrastructure. IMEC aims to diversify trade routes, reduce strategic dependencies, promote regional integration, and future-proof supply chains, unlocking new economic opportunities across Europe, India and Africa. Europe, as mentioned in the agenda, is committed to playing a leading role in IMEC, investing through Global Gateways.     

Within the framework of IMEC’s digital communication, the EU plans to develop the EU-Africa-India Digital Corridor, with an approximately 11,700 km long Blue-Raman submarine cable system. This initiative will provide a direct connection between France, Italy, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Oman, and India. The Mediterranean section of the Digital Corridor is called Blue, while the eastern section leading to India is named after the Indian physicist Chandrasekhara Venkata Raman. The route will bypass Egypt, avoiding the overloading of the Suez Canal, through which about 17% of the cables connecting the West to Asia pass.   

The activation of cooperation between the European Union and India is also an important message. The planned visit of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to India in January 2026 to participate in the Republic Day celebrations underscores the deepening of diplomatic relations. For the EU, which is working to reduce its dependence on Russia for energy or other resources, India is viewed as an important partner for both market diversification and for balancing China’s influence. For India, in turn, the EU remains a major opportunity for technology, investment, and access to high-value markets. This mutually beneficial dynamic is one of the main driving forces behind IMEC. 

The deepening of economic relations between Europe and India is also evidenced by German Chancellor Merz’s visit to India. As a result of negotiations, it is planned to sign a trade agreement worth approximately €120 billion by the end of January this year. 

Greece

Greece stands out against the backdrop of European efforts, as it actively uses its geopolitical and strategic advantages. The country’s Foreign Minister recently announced the appointment of a special envoy for IMEC, emphasizing the initiative’s importance for Greece. Additional steps are also being taken to deepen economic relations with India. Starting in March 2026, direct flights between Greece and India are planned, which are expected to increase the flow of people and goods. In an interview with an American newspaper in March 2025, Greece’s foreign minister stated that all the sections required to create a maritime corridor involve Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, and that the strategic relations of Greece and Cyprus with India and Saudi Arabia create favorable conditions for making IMEC a reality. U.S. President Donald Trump also addressed this discussion via a post on his social media account.

Thus, the European Union and its individual member states, such as Greece, Italy and France, seek to strengthen their positions in IMEC, competing for the expected economic and strategic benefits of the project. 

India and Turkey

Relations between India and Turkey are tense, which directly affects regional infrastructure projects, particularly IMEC. The relations have especially deteriorated after Turkey supplied drones to Pakistan, which were used to strike India. The agreement between Turkey and Pakistan to sell 52 training aircraft also caused India’s dissatisfaction. In this context, India is actively continuing its efforts to diversify its regional policy by expanding economic cooperation and strengthening security relations with other countries. 

One of the latest steps was Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Oman, where agreements were signed under which Oman will begin exporting marble to India, replacing Turkish supplies. Most importantly, Oman has agreed to join IMEC. 

In the context of these tense relations between India and Turkey, the shaping of a possible IMEC route, which will pass through Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to Greece, bypassing Turkey. Turkish President Erdogan strongly criticized the policy of excluding his country from this major project.   

As a countermeasure and alternative, Ankara actively promotes the “Development Road” initiative, proposing a shipping route from the Persian Gulf to Europe through the territory of Iraq and Turkey, thereby bypassing the IMEC member countries.   

Over the past decade, Ankara’s foreign policy, marked by some disagreements with NATO, the acquisition of S-400 missile systems from Russia, military interventions in Syria and Libya, and complex relations with Israel, has led to Turkey’s exclusion from the IMEC. Furthermore, the positions of Turkey and Israel do not coincide with the settlement program established in the Abraham Accords, while Israel itself is the most important hub in the northern part of IMEC. The fact that Turkey itself advances the competitive corridor initiative, through the territory of Iraq, reinforced IMEC’s decision to exclude Turkey from the project. 

Turkish sources, discussing their country’s isolation, note that the further viability of IMEC without Turkey is in question. Turkey, as one of the main links between the West and the East, has a developed infrastructure that has been built up over decades, while many components for the implementation of IMEC need to be created from scratch. This raises the question of whether India will be able to realize the new economic corridor without this traditional “bridge” to Europe.

Israel

As noted, the IMEC concept was published in September 2023, and just a few days later, the attack on Israel and the ensuing prolonged conflict created significant obstacles for the initiative. Despite these complex geopolitical developments, both India and Israel continue making determined efforts to strengthen individual segments of the route.  

The Israeli port of Haifa, IMEC’s terminus in the Eastern Mediterranean, shows how major powers seek to control critical infrastructure amid global competition. 

The historic section of the Haifa Port, known as the Carmel and Eastern Container Terminal, was granted to the Indian Adani Group under a concession in 2023. On the other hand, the newly built Haifa Bayport has been operated by the Chinese Shanghai International Port Group SIPG since 2021.

The water at terminals under Indian control ranges between 14.5 and 15.5 meters, while the Chinese SIPG terminal has a greater navigable depth of 17.3 meters, allowing the use of ships with a capacity of up to 20,000 TEU. Hence, one of IMEC’s key hubs is in a multipolar field of influence from the beginning.

Unlike China’s Belt and Road initiative, funded primarily by the government, the declaration establishing IMEC emphasizes that it should be implemented through both public and private investments. This approach has both advantages (diversity of resources) and risks (complex alignment of participants’ interests). IMEC’s success will depend on how the project’s beneficiaries, from European and Arab countries to India and the United States, resolve their existing disagreements and coordinate their actions for the common goal.   

Enhancing the reliability of the future route through infrastructure diversification is key to overcoming this difficult challenge. Iran’s repeated threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, as well as its overloading, demonstrate the vulnerability of this critically important hub. Although such a step would hurt Iran and its allies more than Israel, which is less dependent on this route and imports energy through other Mediterranean routes, any crisis in the channel, through which about one-fifth of the world’s oil is transported, could have serious consequences for global trade and energy security. 

For this reason, IMEC project participants aim to incorporate detours and alternative routes into the IMEC road network, thereby improving reliability. The Omani ports of Sohar, Duqm and Salalah, located on the coast of the Arabian Sea, were selected as alternative entry points. From these ports, cargo can be transported by land, bypassing potential issues with the Strait of Hormuz. To ensure this connection, Oman and the United Arab Emirates have begun construction of the Hafeet Rail. The ultra-modern 238-kilometer railway, named after the mountain on the border between the two countries, will connect the Omani port of Sohar with the UAE national railway network.  

The most important factor for maritime trade is the depth of the ports, which determines the access of large ships and cargo vessels. Ports with a depth of 16 meters or more are classified as deep ports, which can accommodate, load, and unload ships with a capacity of up to 200,000 tons. And it is no coincidence that the IMEC project includes the ports of Jebel Ali ( with a depth of 17 meters), Omani Duqm (with a depth of 19 meters), Salalah (with a depth of 21 meters), Sohar (with a depth of 25 meters), and Israeli Haifa (with a depth of 16 meters). 

Saudi Arabia

Important political and strategic developments in the region in recent months have posed new challenges to the implementation of IMEC. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a bilateral defense agreement on September 17, 2025, which, according to some experts, could lead to regional changes. Based on the agreement, Saudi Arabia will also become Pakistan’s largest financier in 2026. It is planned to allocate about $6 billion to support the economy, which is almost 25% of the funds Islamabad needs to strengthen it. Saudi Arabia seeks to enhance its defense capabilities by allying with the Islamic nuclear state. This deal concerns India, as Saudi Arabia is one of the founding members of the IMEC project. Although negotiations on military cooperation between Riyadh and Islamabad have been underway for a long time, most analysts agree that Israel’s attack on Doha was the main impetus for the agreement. Six people were killed in an Israeli missile attack on September 9, 2025, one of whom was a Qatari security official, and the others were representatives of HAMAS. The agreement states that an attack on one of the signing parties is considered an attack on an ally. Although economic cooperation between Saudi Arabia and India is quite strong and will remain so in the future, signing a military alliance with its enemy could significantly undermine India’s political trust in Saudi Arabia.       

Saudi Arabia, in turn, has been trying to strengthen defense cooperation with the United States for several years; however, many U.S. decisions have raised concern in Saudi Arabia. Riyadh began seeking additional security mechanisms, culminating in the agreement signed with Pakistan.  

The Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately responded to the signed agreement, noting that “they will study the implications of this development for their national security as well as for regional and global stability.” From a legal standpoint, the agreement means that any military action against Pakistan will be considered an attack on Saudi Arabia.  

However, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman made an official visit to the United States and met with President Trump in November last year. As a result, several agreements of global and regional significance were reached, and the relevant documents were signed. Firstly, it is worth noting the resumption of the IMEC project, which was suspended due to the attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and following military operations. The ceasefire agreement in Gaza allows work on the project to resume. This project simply cannot be realized without Saudi Arabia’s participation    

Saudi Arabia plays a central role in the U.S. Middle East policy. President Trump’s visit to Riyadh in May 2025, which resulted in Saudi Arabia investing $600 billion in the United States, provides clear evidence of this. Saudi Arabia promises to bring investments to $1 trillion at the November meeting. The military cooperation agreement is also noteworthy: the United States provides Saudi Arabia with virtually the highest security guarantees, considering it a NATO non-member ally of the U.S. Moreover, the United States agrees to sell Saudi Arabia modern F-35 fighter jets.  

The agreements reached with the U.S. will significantly increase Saudi Arabia’s influence in the region and enhance its security guarantees, which will naturally increase the likelihood of the IMEC project being implemented. Saudi Arabia’s willingness to join the Abraham Accords is equally important. “We want to be part of the Abraham Accords, but we want also to be sure that we secure a clear path of a two-state solution,” said Mohammed bin Salman. 

Hence, the IMEC project is in a challenging but dynamic phase of development. Although the above-mentioned events imply certain difficulties for participating countries, multilateral relations and the intensification of ties with India indicate the formation of a certain convergence of interests around the idea of IMEC.