From disarming the PKK to the constitutional amendments

Ahead of the next ‘test’ following the two-stage presidential and parliamentary elections in 2023 and local elections in 2024, Turkey has entered a new round of active domestic political reshuffling. From the end of 2024, they will develop conditionally around several issues: 

• The process of normalizing relations between the state and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which is often also presented as an attempt to resolve the Kurdish question, 
• Fight against the opposition,
• Constitutional amendment. 

The aforementioned issues, the first of which also holds important foreign policy and regional significance, form the primary domestic political agenda of the country.  

The State-PKK settlement process launches

On July 11, 30 members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), recognized as a terrorist organization by Turkey and a number of other countries and organizations, laid down their arms at a symbolic ceremony in the Sulaymaniyah Province, Iraq. This was the first stage of active events in the Turkish political arena, which have been ongoing for about 9 months and which the government characterizes as a process aimed at creating a ‘Turkey without terrorism’,  while the Kurdish side sees it as the ‘creation of a peaceful and democratic society’. Sometimes this is presented as a proposal for resolving the Kurdish question in Turkey, which, broadly speaking, represents the sum of all the consequences of the denial of Kurdish identity since the founding of the republic. 

The seeds of this process appeared in the autumn of 2024. The initiator and main actor was Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and a member of the ruling People’s Alliance, who, despite existing opposing views, would not have taken this step without the support or encouragement of his coalition partner, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.    

Bahçeli took his first serious step in October 2024, addressing the founder and leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, who is serving a life sentence in prison on Imralı Island, from the tribune of the country’s parliament. The latter would once again demonstrate that he continues to exert influence not only over the PKK but also over the broader Kurdish masses. Bahçeli called on Öcalan to come to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT), declare an end to terrorism and dissolve the PKK, promising the “right to hope”, in other words, the ‘vague possibility of freedom.’ After this call, a delegation of members of the People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) began visiting Imralı. The DEM, which advocates for the protection of the rights of the country’s national minorities, is another political party of the Kurdish movement represented in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. In February, after the third meeting with Öcalan, the DEM delegation read out his “Call for Peace and Democratic Society”, which stated that PKK should dissolve itself and all groups should lay down their arms. Öcalan stressed that “The collapse of real-socialism in the 1990s due to internal reasons, the dissolution of identity denial in the country, and the advances in freedom of speech led to the PKK's lack of meaning.” Through history, “it has gained strength and support because democratic political channels have been closed,” whereas now, “there is no path other than democracy for seeking and achieving a system.” According to some comments, Öcalan’s call was also to some extent a “helping hand” for the PKK (which had been significantly weakened over the years of struggle) to bring its processes and demands into the political arena without being labelled a ‘traitor.’ In March, the PKK announced a ceasefire in response to Öcalan’s call, and in July, the first symbolic act of surrendering weapons took place, which is expected to be completed in the coming months.

It should be noted that another lengthy process aimed at resolving the conflict between the state and the PKK in Turkey was doomed to failure in 2013-2015. In the summer of 2015, the PKK resumed its attacks. Erdogan stated that “they will continue the fight until the weapons aimed at their state and nation are buried, until the last terrorist is destroyed on their borders.” At the same time, arrests of leaders and members of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), which was the political axis of the Kurdish movement at that time, began. HDP co-chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ were arrested and are still serving their sentences. A process similar to what happened in 2013-2015 never occurred, and the state continued its fight against the PKK, including outside the country, in Iraq and Syria.  

The new process, which, given the above, is often described in the Turkish media as a “new settlement process,” will be implemented in five stages, according to Ankara’s approach. The first was Bahçeli's call, the second was Öcalan’s call, and the third was the PPK’s self-dissolution and laying down of arms. The next steps are the establishment of “legal repatriation” mechanisms for disarmed PKK members and their socio-psychological integration into society. Accordingly, a regulatory commission began its work in August, at GNAT, that will handle legal proceedings related to the last two stages. It is essential that PKK also has initial requirements, and the process should not be one-sided; these include the release of Öcalan and the steps taken by the government towards implementing democratic policies. The Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), which is considered an “umbrella” organization of the PKK, also issued a statement reiterating this point. 

Erdogan takes responsibility for the process 

The day after the ceremony of laying down weapons, on July 12, President Erdogan, for the first time clearly assuming political responsibility for continuing the process, stated in his speech that a commission would be formed and the legal requirements of the process would be discussed in the parliament.  He emphasized that the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which he leads, together with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) as part of the People’s Alliance and the People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), ‘will carry the process forward’. Next, we will refer to other domestic political episodes of cooperation between the ruling right-wing forces and the left-wing forces. It should be noted here that Erdogan, in his speech, recalled the suffering and losses endured by the state, society as a whole and the Kurds, as well as the mistakes made by the governments over the 47 years since the PKK’s first operation in Siirt, in 1984. He emphasized that upon coming to power in 2002, they took several measures to prevent  “the terrorist organization from ensnaring their Kurdish brothers and alienating them from the state and the nation.” He stated that “with the end of terrorism,  Turkey, the nation, every one of their 86 million citizens, whether Turkish, Kurdish or Arab, has won.” 

In his speech, Erdogan repeatedly emphasized the importance of unity among Turks, Kurds and Arabs, even citing historical examples:

“The Seljuk armies mingled with their Kurdish and Arab brothers as they reached Baghdad, Damascus and Manzikert. The Victory of Manzikert, the Conquest of Jerusalem, the Conquest of Istanbul, the defense of Gallipoli, the War of Independence are all joint wars and victories of Turks, Kurds, Arabs, and many other Muslim peoples. The Baghdad of the Arabian Nights was built by Turks, Kurds, and Arabs. Jerusalem was conquered by Turks, Kurds, and Arabs under the command of Saladin. Damascus is our common city. Diyarbakır is our common city. Mardin, Mosul, Kirkuk, Suleymaniye, Erbil, Aleppo, Hatay, Istanbul, and Ankara are our common cities,”  he announced. These words resonated widely within the country: some historians and experts even offered counterarguments, although throughout history the three peoples have also fought against each other (for example, in Halabja). However, it is important to note that Erdogan’s emphasis was deliberate and carried a political message.

The number of Arab citizens in Turkey is small. However, from the point of view of domestic politics, Erdogan’s statement was perceived in pro-government circles as ‘a message to strengthen social solidarity with an emphasis on common heritage, paving the way for socio-economic development and reestablishing the historical unity of the Turkish, Kurdish and Arab peoples.’ However, it was obvious that Erdogan’s speech was in line not only with domestic goals, but above all with the external goals of Middle East policy. According to Abdulkadir Selvi, Hürriyet columnist, known for his close ties to the government, Erdogan simply meant that the PKK is present in the territories of Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran, and Ankara is cooperating with Iraq and Syria, which are Arab states, to destroy it. Meanwhile, in our perception, his neo-Ottoman aspirations were quite evident. However, at this stage, these aspirations may be abstract rather than physical and objective. Erdogan’s speech was the reflection of the goal of forming and strengthening a trouble-free neighborhood with the Turkish state and its society, which, politically speaking, should undoubtedly fall within Ankara’s sphere of influence. However, historian Taner Akçam, who, like many others, described Erdogan’s speech as a manifesto of ‘strategic vision’, didn’t even rule out the possibility of a new political alliance uniting the Arabs and Kurds of Syria, the Kurds of Iraq and the Turks of Turkey, the Kurds of Arabs, for example in a confederation. Actually, it is clear that the ultimate success of this process, which is still highly uncertain, will have a major impact on the region. At the same time, it depends largely not only on internal factors, but also on many external factors, such as the situation of the Kurds in Syria and Iraq, as well as the Kurdish policy of geopolitical powers (the United States, Israel, etc.), which, however, are still in a state of flux. According to Akçam, internally, the issue may have been the prospect of creating a new republic based on Islam that would recognize the existence of the Kurds, rather than the secular republic created on a Turkish ethnic basis in 1923. However, according to Akçam and other analysts, this was merely a rough outline of a vision, and what it will entail will be determined during discussions by the Mejlis committee.

The committee is formed in the Mejlis

In the second half of July, heated discussions began in the Turkish political arena regarding the issues discussed in the committee, the decision-making mechanism and its composition. Given that Erdogan announced that the process would be carried out jointly by the MHP, the AKP and the DEM, the question of representation of the main opposition force – the Kemalist Republican People’s Party (CHP) – was of key importance.

After the government meeting on July 28, Erdogan stated that ‘terror-free Turkey’s process is not only a project of the ruling People’s Alliance, but of the entire nation,’ and called on all parties to cooperate, noting that ‘obstructing this process cannot be forgiven.’ Moreover, it was presented as a ‘rare opportunity for the CHP to atone for the sins of the past,’ demonstrating the party leadership with a challenge and a difficult decision. 

It is known that since March 19, as part of an investigation into corruption involving Istanbul municipal officials, Ekrem İmamoğlu, the Mayor of Istanbul from the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and already a presidential candidate for the CHP, was arrested and sentenced to prison. The number of mayors of the Republican People’s Party (Istanbul, Antalya, Adana) and district heads arrested on various charges since the end of 2024 has reached 15. Some of them were replaced by a state representative, a kayyum, which is already a well-known practice and has been used repeatedly and continues to be used in the southeastern regions of the country inhabited by Kurds, despite criticism that this violates the will of the people as expressed in the elections. Along with the rallies and protests that began after İmamoğlu's arrest,  relations between the government and the CHP became extremely tense. Polarization among the electorate has intensified, and the public and political experts are primarily focused on issues related to the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, and democracy. In this tense situation, the CHP stated that the decisions in the commission should be made by a qualified majority (three-fifths of the votes). In addition, he argued that the commission should focus on issues of democratization, since there cannot be “democracy in Diyarbakir, autocracy in Istanbul,” or "Peace in the East, war in Istanbul." Overall, the CHP expects that the issue of trial without detention in political cases will also be included in the commission’s agenda. The CHP strongly opposes any discussion of constitutional amendments.  

July 30 was the last day for forming the committee. Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmus finally stated that strategic decisions would be made by a qualified majority. The committee will develop legislative proposals that will be submitted to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) ultimately decided to join the committee, not wanting to hinder the positive process surrounding the Kurdish issue, which had been awaiting a democratic solution for decades. The work began on August 5, but the future of both the committee and the settlement process itself remains uncertain. The questions that will be posed to the Republican People’s Party during the committee’s work are also unpredictable. 

Discussion on amending the Constitution

Adopting a new constitution has been high on Turkish President Erdogan’s agenda in recent years. Turkey’s constitution was drafted by order of the military leadership after the coup of September 12, 1980, and adopted in a referendum in 1982. It has been amended 19 times in the last 42 years. The most important amendment was the transition to a presidential system of government in 2017. In general, the need for a new constitution is justified by several key points. In general, the need for a new constitution is justified on several main grounds: the current constitution is a “product of a revolution” and does not reflect the popular will, so a new “civil constitution” is required. Furthermore, these changes, made over many years, “violated the integrity of the constitution.” In May this year, Erdogan already announced the creation of a committee to draft a new constitution, which will include senior officials from the AKP’s central apparatus and leaders of party factions in the Mejlis. The MHP has already prepared its version of the project. Without getting into heated discussions on the content of the constitution, it should be noted that 400 votes are required for a constitutional amendment, and 360 votes for amendments with a referendum in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT). However, public support for the ruling People’s Alliance has dropped significantly, so the referendum is risky. The People’s Alliance, including its potential supporters, has 325-328 seats, the pro-Kurdish DEM party, with which a settlement process is underway, has 56 seats. In case of achieving cooperation with the DEM party on constitutional amendment, the minimum that could be achieved would be to put the draft amendment to a referendum. This fact was the reason for the outrage following Erdogan’s statement in the aforementioned speech that the MHP, the AKP and the DEM  “will carry the process forward together” and are determined “to walk this path together.” The DEM leadership felt it necessary to respond that the alliance of the three parties is only possible within the framework of the settlement process with the PKK and the resolution of the Kurdish issue.   

It should be noted that the PKK is actually not against the constitutional amendment, and is of the opinion that once the PKK lays down its arms, the new constitution should serve “to democratize” Turkey. He believes that the constitution should be passed through the Mejlis with the broadest possible consensus, so the Kemalist Republican People’s Party (CHP) must participate in the process. The CHP, which is under severe political pressure and has strong doubts about using the new constitution for “democratization”, for its part argues that the purpose of the process is to prolong Erdogan’s political life and calls on Erdogan to respect the current constitution first. 

"I tell everyone who brings up constitutional debates with me: 'How can a constitution be made with those who don't abide by the Constitution?' The Constitution also emphasizes international agreements, and you are obligated to recognize ECHR rulings as such. If you don't comply with ECHR rulings, if you don't comply with the rulings of the Constitutional Court in Türkiye, if you don't comply with judicial decisions, if you say 'I don't recognize them,' then you don't comply with the Constitution. Someone who doesn't comply with the Constitution says 'new constitution.' They made a shirt for him in 2017, he doesn't wear it, he walks around the country naked or does whatever he wants. Now, they're saying, 'Make me a new shirt...' We won't be making clothes for Erdoğan from now on. If we're going to make clothes for Erdoğan, we'll do it not with Erdoğan, but with a new parliament that our nation will appreciate,”-stated CHP Chairman Özgür Özel, whose thematic discourse has developed in recent months within the framework of this thought.

Erdogan, in his turn, responded to such claims that “they want the new constitution not for ourselves, but for our country. I have no interest in being reflected or running for reelection.” In fact, before the local government elections on March 31, 2024, he announced that it would be his last election. Nevertheless, the debates on this issue continue. Under the current constitution, Erdogan has two ways to be re-elected for a third time: the first way is to abolish the “two-term rule” in Article 101 of the Constitution. The second, according to Article 116, the Parliament must decide to hold new elections for the second term of the President, i.e. extraordinary elections must be held by decision of the Mejlis.

Where will the new settlement process lead? 

Although the settlement process with the PKK became visible as early as late last year, preparations likely began earlier. To this day, there are different opinions in the Turkish media and the analytical field regarding the question of what specific domestic political problems the initiating and implementing force/forces want to solve beyond the goals of ending terrorism and resolving the Kurdish issue. 

The ruling People’s Alliance has a problem of self-reproduction. The AKP candidate R. T. Erdogan could only win the 2023 presidential election in the second round. In the parliamentary elections of the same year, the AKP gained 35.62% of the votes, while the MHP won 10.7% of the vote, making it a success. However, the fact that the opposition acted within an unpopular combination (we are talking about the “table of the six”). However, ten months later, in the 2024 local elections, the CHP unilaterally overtook the AKP to become the country’s leading political party for the first time since 1977, winning in major cities with 37.81% of the votes. In parallel, the MHP gained 4.99% of the vote, losing more than 3% compared to the previous election. A situation is now emerging where the AKP, with the support of the MHP, may not be able to hold onto power next time round. It is therefore likely that the AKP will need a new partner, especially if we consider a scenario in which Erdogan does not run in the next elections, which is already a serious blow to the party identified with his personality. Furthermore, Erdogan must decide what Turkey will be like after him. According to political analyst Berk Essen, the AKP is now apparently discussing the following issue: Will Turkey after Erdogan, become a country similar to Azerbaijan, where a son/family member came to power after Heydar Aliyev, or will the AKP institutionally strengthen and re-enter the political ranks? At the same time, the MHP, led by the 77-year-old Bahçeli, faces the challenge of gaining a foothold in ‘post-Erdogan Turkey’ and not remaining aloof from active politics. It turns out that both main ruling parties need the support of the Kurds, who make up about 20% of the country’s population, as well as the People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) to gain the trust and support of which the process can be fundamentally directed. It is important that the DEM had a strategic cooperation with the oppositional Republican People’s Party (CHP), so the ruling alliance is also trying to split the opposition in this way. However, the above thesis only summarizes a group of views on the real goals of this process. There are other, even completely opposite, analyses. 

Mümtaz’er Türköne, political scientist and analyst with a fascinating biography, develops a quotable thesis, by which we will summarize the material. Viewing events from a very different perspective, Türköne first of all believes that Bahçeli launched the process without Erdogan. He notes that the process is the construction project of a “nation-state” in which Turks and Kurds are “one nation”. A nation-state where Kurds can exist as Kurds and where Turks accept their existence as Kurds. On the other hand, he says that as the Kurds are numerically small, they have no chance of coming to power alone, but they can be partners in any coalition. Therefore, the only guarantee the Kurds have against the vast majority is a state that respects the constitution, the rule of law, and fundamental human rights, which is what must be built. He believes that the project is not one-sided, and on the other side is Öcalan, who strives for the same goal. Türköne argues that the process that has begun will lead to the end of the AKP and Erdogan’s power, because the Kurdish issue can only be solved through democratization and democracy cannot allow such a government to exist. The latter also explains this thesis by saying that Erdogan initially stayed out of the process and didn’t contribute to its development(1).

Thus, complex and multi-layered, interconnected processes are unfolding in Turkey, which, in all likelihood, will try to be resolved before the next regular or snap elections. These processes, some of which are decisive for Turkey’s future, will also gradually arrange the pieces on the electoral chessboard. In the current situation, not only the decisions and steps of the ruling bloc, but also those of the opposition forces will have an impact.  

This new process of self-disbanding the PKK, laying down its arms and bringing about positive changes in the Kurdish issue, which is considered key to current events, if it succeeds, claims that it will first solve the main problem of the state and society - the problem of terrorism and then, although unlikely, maybe put an end to the problems that make up the Kurdish issue. 

However, even though geopolitical conditions were indeed favorable for its launch, it is difficult to see this process as pursuing an exclusively stated goal, merely as a “sudden manifestation of goodwill” towards the Kurds, or a natural result of the ruling government’s long-standing policy.   

Opinions that this is a sophisticated strategy devised by the ruling bloc to retain power and divide the opposition should not be ignored. Obviously, in case of success, the parties of the ruling bloc, together or separately, will demonstrate that the result was achieved in the course of their activities and thanks to their will, trying to gain political capital. In addition, they will try to collect as many dividends as possible during the process itself. The CHP, for its part, is trying to reap dividends by demonstrating constructiveness in the process, which it is trying to do. However, it is also crucial not to fall into another ‘trap’ set by the ruling authorities, which could lead to a discussion on the issue of the Constitutional amendment.  

The assessment that the settlement process is or will lead to a government reconstruction project is also realistic. If successfully resolved, the outcome of this process could indeed be the formation of Turkey on a new ideological basis, whether it was conceived and implemented with the original aim of serving narrow party or broad state interests.  

We should not rule out a possible scenario in which it could fail, leading to new developments, perhaps even snap elections.