T urkey’s influence and involvement in Syria have been growing since the fall of Bashar al-Assad. 

Goals

The two main goals of the Syrian policy formulated under the leadership of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan between 2011-2013, were as follows:  

• Achieve the overflow of the Bashar al-Assad regime. This involved supporting Sunni Arab groups to establish a new government in Syria that would share Turkey’s regional vision as much as possible, thereby strengthening Turkey’s influence in post-crisis Syria.  
• Prevent the strong self-organization of the Kurdish population in northern Syria as well as in Iraq. 

These goals were symbolically summarized by Erdogan, a proponent of neo-Ottoman and Islamist ideas, in his 2012 speech at the Majlis, where he emphasized the aim “to perform namaz at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus.” 

Ankara took visible and invisible military, political, financial, and diplomatic steps to achieve these goals, positioning itself for years as a key actor in shaping the course of the Syrian conflict. However, beyond its foreign policy objectives, these actions also concerned Turkey’s domestic political agenda. In particular, the influx of Syrian refugees shortly after the outbreak of the crisis (the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey has reached 3.6-3.7 million and now stands at 2.9 million) led to a political polarization within Turkey over Ankara’s role in the war, which was further exacerbated by growing economic challenges.   

Achievements

T he removal of Bashar al-Assad, somewhat surprising to the world and even to Syrians, was characterized in the Turkish and international press not only as a success recorded by Hayat Tahir al-Sham (H.T.S.) and its leader Ahmad Hussein al-Sharee (known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani) but also as a “Turkish victory”. Although it is controversial and debatable because the years and resources spent affect the perceptions of ‘victory’, and their ambiguity, let us list Turkey’s main achievements in Syria: 

• Change of Power: Turkey’s initial goal and demand have definitely failed. Assad remained in power until 2024 with the support of Russia, Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Ankara waited nearly 14 years to achieve its goal of overthrowing Assad. However, it now holds significant influence over Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with which it has maintained ties since the group controlled parts of Syria’s Idlib province. This influence seriously strengthened Turkey’s role in Syria and, more broadly, in the Middle East. This is evidenced by the ceremonial visits to Damascus by the head of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT), Ibrahim Kalin and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Kalin’s prayer in the Umayyad Mosque (considered the fourth most important mosque in the Islamic world after the Al-Haram, Al-Nabawi and Al-Aqsa mosques), Fidan’s tea party with al-Sharaa on Mount Qasioun. Erdogan, who has already been called ‘Conqueror of Damascus”(Şam Fatihi), and ‘Conqueror of Syria’ (Suriye Fatihi) on the propaganda and public level, will also visit Damascus soon (1,2,3). And in general, after the removal of Assad, the red line in Erdogan’s speeches about Syria is the idea that Turkey’s borders or its sphere of influence are much broader than its current territory. This once again proves that Erdogan sees Syria as a natural zone of influence in which the Ottoman spirit should revive.      
• Border security and the Kurdish issue: Through military interventions such as ‘Euphrates Shield’ (2016), ‘Olive Branch’ (2018), ‘Spring of Peace’ (2019), Turkey has advanced deeper into the territory of the neighboring country, sufficiently limiting the capabilities of the Kurds of the ‘Syrian Democratic Forces’ and the ‘People’s Defense Units’ considered one of its military wings in northern Syria. This has primarily hindered the potential development of ties between the Kurds of Syria, Turkey, and Iraq. Of course, Ankara did it with special packaging, such as ‘fight against terrorism’ and ‘need to ensure border security’. Nevertheless, Kurdish forces still control large areas in northern Syria with US support. 
   

New Middle East Dynamics 

D evelopments in Syria will bring new dynamics to the Middle East region. Turkey’s relations with Iran and Russia, with which there was the Astana contact format, will be transformed. Turkey-EU relations will also shift, as it seems that Brussels is beginning to see Syria as a more understandable interlocutor and partner in contrast to Ankara. Relations between Turkey and Arab countries can further improve, of which, for instance, relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which have largely been mended in recent years, will enable the parties to collaborate on reconstruction and rebuilding projects in Syria while competing. Ankara will simultaneously work with all players to ensure the return of Syrian refugees to their country, which will be possible once conditions improve there and stability is established.  

Israeli-Turkish relations may face increased tension as Israel seeks to weaken the Shi’ite axis in the region but has no interest in forming a strong Sunni axis under Erdogan’s leadership. Yaakov Lapin, one of the analysts at the Israeli think tank Alma, wrote in a recent article: “Turkey’s very influence in the area, guided by Erdogan, who defines himself as the “Protector of Islam” and as one who wants to “liberate al-Aqsa,” does not bode well for Israel. Turkey’s president has already stated that in his opinion, Jerusalem should be the focus of Muslim attention, and he did not hesitate to defame Israel with harsh and anti-Semitic labels.”

Meanwhile, many regional issues will be influenced by the stance of newly elected US President Donald Trump’s administration, which may still reshape the situation, as well as the new Syrian strategy of Russia and Iran.  

Reshaping Political Agenda

I t is clear that nothing has ended with the removal of Assad in Syria, and a new phase is beginning. Further developments in Syria will depend on various issues, including whether the current government and the new constitution will be inclusive and as secular as possible, whether Syria’s unity will be preserved and a unitary state formed, and what stance Syria’s minorities, such as Alawites, Druze, and Christians, will express. Thus, it can be said that Turkey’s policy in Syria has not been finalized and is merely entering a new phase. 

In a post-Assad Syria, Turkey will make an effort to:  

• Preserve the country’s unity and territorial integrity while avoiding actions that could strengthen the position of Israel and other external forces there.
• Increase pressure on Kurdish forces in the north, both directly and through the new Syrian government, to prevent the establishment of Kurdish autonomy.
• Facilitate the return of Syrian refugees to their homeland. 

Alongside all this, Turkey, leveraging its historical, cultural and political ties, will seek to maintain its central role in post-Assad Syria, to lead local and international efforts to rebuild the country and establish stability, while also advancing its own state and national agenda and interests. 

Thus, while Turkey’s Syrian policy has achieved visible progress over the years, its outcomes remain incomplete and ambiguous. In the near future, Ankara will actively pursue efforts and actions to achieve its political objectives, marking the beginning of a new phase of Turkish policy in Syria.