Russian “Soft Power” and Public Diplomacy
8 m. | 2022-05-16A t the end of the 20th century and early 21st century, significant changes took place in the global world. With the collapse of the bipolar system and with the establishment of a new political system in a number of states, the nature of the classical diplomacy and international relations started to be changed. The state’s authority and the perception of the international community gained a great importance, hence the states began to give more and more importance to the “soft power” and public diplomacy, which became one of the characteristics of the countries’ foreign policy power.
“Soft power” implies the realization of the state’s goals not on the basis of coercion but of voluntariness and attractiveness. The term was first used by Joseph Nye, the professor of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. According to him, it is important to set an agenda in world politics and to involve others not by military force or economic sanctions, but by attractiveness. The idea of attractiveness put forward by Nye is the main characteristic of the “soft power” and that’s how it differs from propaganda the perception of which are far more negative. Contrary to the “hard power”, the resources of the “soft power” are not tengible and take a long time to sell. Those resources include culture, political values and foreign policy. At the same time, it is difficult to measure the effectiveness and impact of “soft power”.
Public diplomacy term is directly and closely linked to the “soft power”. Although the toolkit of public diplomacy was used long before, especially during the Cold War, when the USSR and the U.S. began to use the methods of public diplomacy in the information war. The term public diplomacy was originally introduced at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. The aim of public diplomacy can be to make own culture, values, ideology and foreign policy more perceptible for foreign community and government, as well as the change of their moods, so as to influence that country’s foreign policy decisions. The terms “soft power” and “public diplomacy” are sometimes identified, however, it should be noted that public diplomacy is practically an instrument of the “soft power”.
Although the “homeland” of public diplomacy is the USA, currently special bodies have been established in a number of countries, the activities of which are aimed at achieving the goals of public diplomacy, such as spreading the knowledge about the language, culture and country and ensuring positive moods about it, such as the British Council (Great Britain), the Goethe Institute (Germany), The Alliance Française (France), the Cervantes Institute (Spain), the Japan Foundation (Japan), the Korean Foundation (Korea), The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (China).
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was the first to speak about the “soft power” in Russian political circles in 2008. He described the term as an “ability to influence the world through civilization, humanitarian-cultural, foreign policy and other attractiveness”. In an article titled “Russia and the Changing World” published in 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin characterized the concept “soft power” as “a set of tools and methods for achieving foreign policy goals without the use of weapons, but through information and other levers of influence.” By this definition Russian President emphasizes not the attractiveness, which is a key to Nye’s wording, but the levers of influence, equating “soft power” with “non-military power”.
Referring to the public diplomacy, it is interpreted differently in various Russian circles. Some specialists and experts in the field view public diplomacy as the usage of modern PR tools and mechanisms developed by non-governmental organizations, to advance public policy goals. According to the other group, the main issue of organizations dealing with public diplomacy shouldn’t be to serve the interests of the state, but to communicate with the societies of other states in order to deepen mutual understanding between peoples. The main reason for the controversy is that the professional literature translates the term “public diplomacy” in two ways in Russian: ‘публичная дипломатия’ and ‘общественная дипломатия’. Social diplomacy (общественная дипломатия) views the concept of public diplomacy in a narrower sense, which causes a confusion.
R ussia has a fairly good potential for the effective application of the “soft power”, however it is implemented not fully and with low efficiency. One of the reasons is that the use of the “soft power” is quite new for Russia, unlike the West. Within the context of the implementation of public diplomacy issues, Russia, besides using the capabilities of the mass media, began to actively use other tools only in the 2000s. In particular, the Russian World Foundation was established in 2007, to ensure the spread of the Russian language, Gorchakov Fund to Support Public Diplomacy was established in 2010, to work with NGOs and to conduct public diplomacy through them, the Russian International Affairs Council was established in 2010, to conduct research and to train specialists, and so on. In 2013, the “soft power” was officially included in the Russian foreign policy concept.
On the other hand, as a result of the effective use of the West’s “soft power”, which also had a great impact including on the collapse of the USSR, it’s quite hard for Russia to restore its own authority in Western societies. Russia itself is perceived as a state apparatus. There are not many political and social forces in the West, which are in favor of normalization of relations with Moscow and they are not very popular. In Western countries, the Russian media and NGO sector fails to impact significantly on perceptions towards Moscow, since both the media and organizations are directly linked to state power and their activities are perceived as propaganda. Nevertheless, currently there is an open struggle against Russian media in Western countries, especially against Russia Today and Sputnik.
It is quite difficult to form or maintain positive attitude towards Russia even in the post-Soviet territory. Generally, in recent decades, Russia has used the classic toolkit of the “soft power”, such as opening the branches of Russian schools and Russian universities, educational and cultural events, work of non-governmental organizations. Nevertheless, Russia’s political, cultural, humanitarian influence, which was strong in the 1990s and early 2000s, continues to weaken. Moreover, the Baltic states are already members of the European Union, three out of the six countries of the Eastern Partnership (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) have association agreements with the European Union. Not only did Russia’s influence weaken in these countries, but Russia is perceived extremely negative. Here the Western “soft power” works quite effectively. Unlike the Russian “soft power”, whose activities are limited to political, diplomatic, historical (including the common historical past, the USSR, which is perceived more negatively, and only a small number of people perceive it positively), and educational spheres, the Western “soft power” covers a huge field of activities: democratic development, human rights (with separate branches), leadership, ecology, health, culture, art, science, sports, information technology and so on. One of the reasons for the low efficiency of the Russian “soft power” is the use of “hard power”. As it was mentioned, the development of the “soft power” policy started only after 2008, more precisely in the 2010s. It was during that period, that the armed conflict took place in South Ossetia, which was than followed by the conflicts in the East Ukraine, the events in Crimea, the increase of Russian forces in Syria in the 2010s and the Russian special operation in Ukraine, which started in February, 2022.
The “loss” of Ukraine, being closest to Russia in terms of culture and language further highlighted the failure of the Russian “soft power”. The reason is that Russia showed inertial approach towards Ukraine, which didn’t have the desired outcome in case of the young generation. On the other hand, the lack of necessary work with the Ukrainian society was due to the fact that this society wasn’t fully studied and the probability of controversy with Kyiv was underestimated. The Western "soft power" competently and effectively complemented Moscow's shortcomings in Ukrainian society. Unlike the Russian “soft power”, the Western one is multi-centered․ It is funded both by government agencies and non-governmental organizations, it works both with government agencies and with broad sections of society, hence its association with politics is rather weak.
After Russia’s special operation in Ukraine, even if there are no geopolitical changes, regional “status quo” change is inevitable. The notion of “soft power” and its practical application will change. Russia will face the issue of restoring its own reputation. In such a situation, Russia must adopt a systemic approach to the “soft power” policy and expand its scope, including wider sectors of foreign society. Moscow should pay more attention and make more efforts first of all among the allies. The Asia-Pacific region, Latin America, Middle East perhaps can be relatively effective ways to develop positive attitudes towards Russia. At the same time, to increase the effectiveness of the “soft power” policy, Russia must first increase its own attractiveness, including for its society.