The most attractive military alliance for countries 

N ATO is the West’s example of an alliance that was launched to ensure the security of its member states. This in practice means deterring the threat posed by the Soviet Union and states affiliated with the old Warsaw Pact. NATO is a multilateral alliance based on a formal agreement—the Washington Treaty (1949)- provides security guarantees for each member state. In addition, it has been a defensive alliance that aims in maintaining the sovereignty and freedom of its members. However, what distinguishes NATO from alliances of the past is its subordination to the United Nations Charter[1].

70 years since the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) it is still considered the most popular alliance among nation states, with many aspiring to be part of it. After its creation new member states have increased from the original 12 countries to 29. 4 countries now are in the process of joining or considered as aspiring to join while 21 countries participate in NATO's Partnership for Peace program and with 15 other countries involved in institutionalized dialogue programs with the organization.

As Ronald D. Asmus (former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs) argues, there were three main goals for the expansion of NATO to counter ten post-communist countries: to build a post-Cold War Europe “whole, free, and at peace”; to renew the transatlantic alliance; and to reposition the United States and Europe to address global challenges[2].

NATO was created to oppose the Soviet threat. With the collapse of the USSR the idea of NATO’s existence was put into question.  Another issue was the format and the purpose of the Alliance.

On April 4, 1949 twelve nations from Western Europe and North America signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C. Source: NATO

NATO’s history of enlargement can be divided into 4 main stages: First wave was the Post-Cold war membership in 1999, second was the biggest wave in NATO’s enlargement history in 2004, followed by 2009 and 2017.  According to NATO’s official website, provision for enlargement is given by Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that membership is open to any “European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and ready to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area”. Any decision to invite a country to join the Alliance is taken by the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s principal political decision-making body, on the basis of consensus among all Allies[3].

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO was forced to reinstate its image in Eastern Europe developing a new cooperative relationship with Russia and its former allies. Thus, the Alliance launched a series of cooperative initiatives (NACC, EAPC, Partnership for Peace (PfP) etc…) But there are at least, two different sets of partner countries: those interested in becoming full members of NATO, and those interested in maintaining some kind of cooperation with the Alliance rather than full membership.

How NATO changed after the Cold War: The role of USA and criticism towards NATO expansion.

It is said the main advocate of NATO’s expansion was Bill Clinton’s administration. Republicans believed that they, not Bill Clinton’s party had been the engine driving enlargement although The Republicans had written on enlargement policy into the contract with America in 1994. They had driven the legislative process from 1994 to 1996[4]." Indeed, Clinton’s administration gained huge support from figures, such as James Goldgeier, Anthony Lake, Richard Holbrooke and Madeleine Albright.  Before Bill Clinton, the idea of NATO enlargement had little support within the American administration. "A major role in promoting the idea was played by Anthony Lake. The main resistance in the USA against the enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance, supported mainly by military-strategic and geopolitical arguments, came from the military spheres, especially from the Ministry of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff[5]".  

Many experts note that the process of NATO enlargement initially got criticism both in the academic and political spheres. In that period, the dean of America’s Russia experts, George F. Kennan, had called the expansion of NATO into Central Europe “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post–Cold War era.”  "Kennan, the architect of America’s post–World War II strategy of containment of the Soviet Union, believed, as it did with most other Russian experts in the United States, that expanding NATO would damage beyond repair U.S. efforts to transform Russia from enemy to partner[6]".

John Lewis Gaddis criticized the Clinton administration, mentioning that NATO enlargement could antagonize Russia and boost anti-Western forces in Russian society. (Gaddis 1998: 28) There were also many collective actions against NATO enlargement. In June 1997, an open letter written by fifty US security experts, officials and politicians across the whole political spectrum was published labeling NATO enlargement “a policy error of historic importance.” In their opinion, NATO enlargement would decrease Russian readiness to cooperate with the West, draw new dividing lines in Europe, degrade NATO’s ability to provide Article 5 guarantees, involve the USA in unsettled disputes across Central and Eastern Europe[7]".

Also, the existing fear that enlargement could damage growing relations with Russia was mentioned by Ronald Asmus in his works. This brought revelations on the Presidents of United States and Russia Clinton and Yeltsin who had an agreement on the timing of NATO expansion. Clinton wanted to advocate his expansion during his reelection campaign, to increase his appeal among Americans of Eastern European descent. Asmus reveals, that Clinton agreed not to publicly endorse NATO expansion until August 1996, after his Russian counterpart was safely returned to office[8]. Once President Clinton suggested that NATO had successfully transcended the Cold War and was an alliance that was renovating itself, “directed no longer against a hostile block of nations, but instead designed to advance the security of every democracy in Europe – NATO’s old members, new members and non-members alike[9]”. The Russian attitude towards NATO enlargement in the early 1990s was by no means a categorical denial. Boris Yeltsin claimed in 1993 that expanding the alliance to Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia did not contravene Russian interests. (Vykoukal 2003: 222) However, in the middle of the 1990s Russian negative attitude to NATO enlargement was very strong.

NATO concepts have changed over the years and it is necessary to note that NATO Strategic goals have been the core document that defines NATO’s role in security issues.  After the Cold War, NATO adopted three strategic concepts, namely in 1991, 1999 and 2010. Regarding the procedures these strategies are very different from those during the Cold War. First, contrary to Cold War concepts, NATO strategies are not classified. Second, post-Cold War strategies were approved by the NAC (North Atlantic Council) and not by the Military Committee. Third, while Cold War strategies concentrated on the military sector of security, nowadays NATO strategies pay much more attention to other security sectors[10]. Nevertheless, the fundamental NATO tasks remain unchanged – to safeguard freedom and security for all members using political and military means in accordance with the UN Charter.  

In the 1991 NATO’s Strategic Concept declared its commitment to pursue dialogue and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. NATO assumed also an active role in crisis management and conflict prevention.

The 1999 NATO Strategic Concept defined that the collective defense was of primary importance. NATO’s traditional tasks and goals were not changed. The only exception was its renouncement of the need to create a counterbalance against the Soviet Union (Venturoni 1999: 8–9) In the 2010 Strategic Concept, NATO reaffirmed as its main goals and tasks to its commitment to collective defense and consultation on member states’ security problems. The Central and Eastern European member states especially opposed the idea of refocusing NATO from collective defence to traditional tasks. Poland paid great attention to the traditional tasks of NATO. (Winid 2009) The Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Vondra supported the idea that Article 5 had to remain the core of NATO. (Vondra 2010) A very similar attitude was adopted by Hungary, Bulgaria as well by the Baltic States. Norway also took up a very similar stance[11].

Secretary of State Dean Acheson signs the Washington Treaty, April 4, 1949. Source: US National Archives

Disagreements between France, Germany and US

F rom the early days of the European Movement, the countries that later formed the European Union have had the ambition of creating their own foreign policy and their own defense and military institutions. Early efforts to create a European military organization introduced twin themes that have been debated with developments ever since after 1945: on the one hand, the desire of European states to move integration forward, including a defense elements (and, concomitantly, arrangements for making possible a “European” foreign policy); and, on the other hand, a recognition that, for many purposes, U.S. strategic commitment, military power, and the preeminence of a U.S.-led alliance have been indispensable[12].

The end of the cold war brought a new round of discussions among the European Union regarding foreign policy and defense institutional arrangements, as well as a significant change in the U.S. perspective. After 1990, the European security environment changed significantly. US decided to withdraw its troops from Europe. The large numbers of NATO troops to guarantee Europe’s freedom against a nuclear and conventional Soviet menace were no longer seen as necessary.  The European NATO members came into a position that they could establish European security without the support of the United States. Anand Menon mentions that "US cannot both leave and ask Europeans not to have a defense of their own. If the Americans were going to contribute less, Europe needed to develop its own capabilities[13]".

In 1986 in the Single European Act as a momentum towards the development of a collective European defense, the direction took greater shape in December 1991 at the Maastricht meeting. The European Union agreed on “the long-term perspective of a common defense policy within the European Union, which might in time lead to a common defense. The issue of the West European Union was addressed as a possible defense component of the EU. NATO recognized the development of greater European responsibility regarding security and defense and adopted its political and military structures to reflect the emerging European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)[14].

In this case the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), was considered as a competitor and a supportive instrument for NATO.  The problem was that, the two European leading countries, Germany and France had a different approach towards US and it's leadership in Europe. Both countries have tried to have a big role in drawing European security architecture from the US.  Thus, the relation of ESDP to NATO was strongly affected by the national interests of France and Germany. The development of ESDP as either a competitor or supporter of NATO depended on whether the French or the German approach to European security became dominant.

In April 2003, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg proposed to establish separate European military planning capabilities which led critics to question the solidarity among NATO members. France and Germany supported this proposal to strengthen ESDP, although this step could easily be interpreted as competitive with NATO’s European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).

The reason for France and Germany to develop European capabilities regarding security beyond NATO’s framework of ESDI has different historical roots. Analysis of the historical evolution of security policy in France and Germany shows the vast differences in each nation’s objectives. First of all, the post WWII experience of France helped to create a security policy, which emphasizes French sovereignty and claim to leadership in Europe, independent military capabilities for the European Union and a separation from US domination in European security issues. In June 1997, NATO clarified its approval regarding the availability of NATO resources to EU-led operations.

The following events show that French aspirations had 3 main challenges. First of all, the Balkan crisis made it clear that there is a huge gap between the military capabilities of the EU and of NATO with its US resources. All members of the EU, including France, had to recognize that the EU was not able to control this regional conflict without the support of the US.  Second, NATO showed its capability to adapt to any new situation. NATO started to pay more attention to Articles. For instance, Article 10 of the Washington treaty, the admission of new member states, played a major role in NATO adoption to the new challenges. NATO’s invitation to Eastern European countries led to a confirmation of NATO’s role as guarantor of European security. Eastern Europe was more interested in NATO’s security umbrella than relying on the EU’s plans to assure European defense. That's why Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined EU members Britain, Spain, Italy, Denmark and Portugal in signing a letter in January 2003 to support Washington's stance on Iraq. The French reaction was  remarkable, President Jacques Chirac called the letters "infantile" and "dangerous," adding: "They missed a great opportunity to keep quiet[15]." Third, France’s absence of NATO’s integrated military structure prevented France from influencing NATO’s new adjustments.

Regarding Germany’s foreign policy, it is worth to mention, that country’s strong reaction to preventing future conflict, yet the focus and execution are quite different. Germany wanted to be part of multilevel security organizations, had equal cooperation with European partners and NATO, while accepting more international responsibility.

The development of the ESDP could be the greatest challenge to the future of NATO, as it could become a tool to duplicate NATO capabilities. But today, there is nothing to worry about, as NATO is the only security providing alliance in both sides of Atlantic.

The analysis of these historical events shows that nowadays relations between NATO and especially between US and France, US and Germany have their impact on future growth of the Alliance. Moreover, it is the US who mainly supports countries in their path to NATO membership.

Another bone in US-German-French relationship was there opposition to the Iraq war in early 2003. The European NATO members France and Germany opposed the US strategy of preemptive force against Iraq in the absence of a concrete mandate by the United Nation’s Security Council. The fact is France, as well as Germany, interpreted the UN resolution 1441 as not including a preemptive military force which does not suggest that they shared a common approach to the Iraqi crisis. Germany ruled out the use of military means even before the final results of the weapons inspection were presented. France, in contrast, did not oppose the use of force, had a new UN resolution sanctioned it.  Critics saw the Franco-German opposition to the US-led “coalition of the willing” as a further weakening of the European Pillar of NATO. However, this opposition was not representative of the European Union and member countries did not find consensus on the Iraq question[16].

The hard path for Baltic States

A lliance expansions between 1999 and 2004, and a strong commitment to continuing its enlargement process appeared to signal that NATO was not just muddling through. Enlargement was as an energetic affirmation, with more countries eagerly seeking membership this seemed to suggest that the organization had successfully adapted its identity to they new conditions and has retained its relevance[17].

The Baltic states’ desire to become a NATO and EU member was a policy priority after re-independence in 1991.  Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania started to work towards economic revitalisation, civil and military spheres to meet the EU and NATO standards. Though their path to membership was very hard with several obstacles.  Since 1991, these countries actively worked on strengthening political, economic and social ties with the international and European organizations. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania made good relations with their neighbouring countries. There was an attempt for the normalization of relations between the Baltic States and Russia, with Finland as the initiator. From the Russian point of view, the Baltic States are considered to be part of two lost empires —the Russian and the Soviet[18]. Russia likes to mention "near abroad" term, but as above mentioned author notes, "Moscow should realize that what it calls its “near abroad” is also the “near abroad” of the West".  Thus, Baltic states possible membership was under strong pressure by Russia. It argued that the West should keep NATO's doors shut to them.

In general, Baltic states faced many problems after independence as many other Post-Soviet countries. First, they needed to have an army, with NATO standards. But the military infrastructure was in decay, modern equipment and logistical support were almost non-existent and public support for a professional military was extremely low. There existed a number of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian military men in uniform, but they had served in other countries' armed forces and received different type of trainings. So Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had to build their national defence establishments from zero. "The pressing operational task was to secure the final withdrawal of Russian troops and to secure the state borders. Having successfully achieved the operational requirement of defining their sovereignty within secure borders, it was then possible for these three States to start the huge task of building national security and defence structures[19]".

On 29 March 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia formally became members of NATO by depositing their instruments of accession with the United States Government. Source: NATO

As with most other Central European countries including the Baltic States  NATO is seen as the main security guarantor in Europe. Their question for membership though was not in the agenda in 1999 for several reasons. First, their territory was not defensible, second, they were not ready politically, economically and militarily.. Third, problems with their Russian minorities existed. And finally, there was no threat to the Baltics.  At that time Russia was not considered as a main threat for Baltic security. Though Bill Clinton has assured that NATO's open door policy is real. The reality is that NATO was not only the US with other members opinions also needed to be considered. For instance, the German Chancellor Schroeder said no new nations will be invited to join NATO this year. The alliance needs a 'period of consolidation' after the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic[20].

German attitude towards Baltic states membership was negative initially. This country had its own interests and fears.  First, Germany was afraid of negative impact on relations with Russia.  Berlin gave top priority to the Baltic membership in the EU and to increasing regional cooperation in the Baltic area.  Their EU membership would stabilize those states and create a tremendous outlet for German exports and investments. The EU's expansion would also give Germany an ever greater voice in EU's future activities.

By 1996, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel  Kohl openly opposed anything that might aggravate Russia. He attacked Washington for raising the issue in an election year (as if democratic debate should be banned). He emphasized EU's (i.e., Germany's) trade with Russia as a factor leading to its integration and implicitly as a factor working against the Baltics[21]. By May 1996, Kinkel's public opposition to Baltic entry into NATO due to the Russian factor became clear. By January 1997, German sources hinted at a deal formally to exclude the Baltic states from membership for 5-10 years in return for Russian acceptance of NATO expansion. Kinkel again hinted at possible EU membership for Estonia alone (the strongest Baltic economy)[22].

However, German policy slowly began to shift in the course of 2001– 2002, when it became increasingly apparent that support for Baltic membership was growing, especially in the United States. During a visit to Riga (Latvia) in February 2002, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer formally announced German support for Baltic membership, noting that an invitation to the Baltic states to join NATO at the Prague summit would “erase the lines of injustice and division in Europe[23].”  This brought German policy firmly in line with U.S. and French policy.

France was one of the first Alliance members, who adjusted its policy. In 2001 during a visit to the Baltic states, French President Chirac announced France’s support for Baltic membership. Sensing that U.S. policy was moving toward support of Baltic membership, Chirac decided to make a virtue out of necessity and get some credit for what was a clearly growing U.S. support of Baltic membership in the Alliance[24].

It is worth mentioning, that the support for Baltic membership into NATO was much weaker in Europe than it was in the United States. The US was the only country who started to support the Baltic states from the very beginning. The United States’ role has been—and remains—critical in enhancing security in the Baltic region. The US was one of the few Western countries that never recognized the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. While not providing an explicit security guarantee—as the Balts initially wanted—the US committed itself in the charter to help create the conditions for eventual Baltic membership into NATO. Then along with Denmark, the US took the lead in coordinating military assistance to Baltic countries through the Baltic Security Assistance group (BALTSEA)[25].

For the political and tactical reasons, the US administration was careful not to announce which countries would be issued invitations at the Prague NATO summit. Thus, they wanted to keep pressure on candidates to continue reforms and prevent any backsliding.  It is interesting, that even in the late of 2000, many observers and  members of the policy elite in Washington would not give the three Baltic states much chance of being invited to join the Alliance at the Prague summit. At that time, most observers expected that there would be a relatively small enlargement policy at the Prague summit, which would include Slovenia and Slovakia (the so-called “Slo-Slo” option) and at most one Baltic country—and even that seemed a long shot. By the summer of 2002, however, it was widely assumed that all three Baltic states would receive invitations at Prague[26].

According to  Stephen Larrabee, there were several reasons or factors for that decision.  For the first one the author suggests the Baltic states performance. "In terms of democratic consolidation and market reform the Baltic states ranked at the head of the enlargement queue, along with Slovenia". Though other experts and scholars would hardly agree with him, as many of them argue that Baltic states at that time did not meet NATO standards at all. Yes, they had progress, but it was not enough for them. The question was political.  Continuing Larrabee’s thoughts on the issue he mentions that the second factor was Russia. Russia continued to oppose Baltic membership in principle but also wanted to concentrate on improving relations with NATO. As the third factor mentioned US foreign policy after September 11. "The main U.S. strategic priority became the war on terrorism. For this the United States needed as broad a coalition of allies as possible"[27]. And finally the last factor was a growing belief that it did not make sense to invite only one Baltic state, for instance Estonia.

However, the invitations to the Baltic states at Prague summit represent an important victory for the Baltic states. But conditions after Prague changed, because it was important  to ensure that NATO’s Article 5 guarantee is not just a paper guarantee but is backed up by real military capabilities to defend the Baltic states in a crisis. But the key challenge in the post-Prague period therefore is to find a strategic agenda that will maintain U.S. interest in the region, as the US was seen as the main supporter.

To reiterate, Russia was against Baltic state's membership to NATO. Russia unconditionally opposed their entry into NATO, calling it unacceptable. Russia's 1993 military doctrine also explicitly stated that an alliance's expansion to states on its borders, e.g., the Baltic states, threatens vital Russian interests. In 1997, Russia's Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov said that the issue of the Baltic states and NATO was a condition for future East-West cooperation.

It is not new news that Post-Soviet states were and are considered by Russia as a near abroad and new partners and engagements are threat for Russian security. But  there is another factor that also matters for Russia — strong economic interests.

When Baltic states started to work to get NATO membership, Russia was afraid of it and started to block all steps, initiatives, because over 40 percent of Russia’s  oil and gas exports go through Baltic ports[28]. . The interesting part of this history is Russia's attitude towards the Baltic states membership in EU.  As this country saw no problem, moreover, Baltic states membership could facilitate closer relations between Russia and the EU.

Coming back to the NATO membership process, Russia also always mentioned the Russian minority issue, which was a source of friction, especially between Russia and Estonia and Latvia. The minority issue was less of a problem with Lithuania because Lithuania has a relatively small Russian-speaking population. Russian authorities have used the minority issue to exert pressure on the Baltic states to achieve broader foreign policy goals. Economic interests of nonstate actors such as Gazprom and LUKoil also influenced Russian policy toward the Baltic states[29].

From the security approach Russia had fears for Kaliningrad—the former German city of Königsberg. Post-Prague period showed that this city became an increasingly important part of the Baltic security agenda. The region now is detached from Russia and bordered by NATO and EU members Poland and Lithuania. After the collapse of the USSR, the region was highly militarized, though later Russia reduced its troops. It was also a place of drugs, criminals and etc. After the membership these countries have been required to impose strict border and visa requirements on Kaliningrad citizens wishing to travel west or to Russia. Both countries had fears that soldiers or criminal groups would enter their countries.

"Given Germany’s strong historical ties to Kaliningrad, many local officials hoped that Germany would play an active role in helping to revitalize the region. However, Germany has maintained a low profile regarding Kaliningrad. Berlin has been reluctant to become too strongly engaged economically in the region for fear of sparking Russian fears of German “revanchism” and that it intended to “reclaim” Kaliningrad at some point[30]".

Now Kaliningrad region still an issue both for Russia and for NATO member countries. Russia tries to defend the region from NATO and its members and has had fears that the region can be isolated from Russia. The biggest fear for NATO and NATO members Lithuania and Poland is that Russia might attempt to close the "Suwalki Gap," the 60-mile-long stretch of Poland that separates Kaliningrad from Belarus — strategic ally of Russia. If Russia invaded that stretch of land, the Baltic states would be cut off from the rest of Europe.  Thus, it is clear that the Baltic states membership was a headache for Russia and another problem for security. That's why Russia used its all measures to block these countries. But the history shows that these countries are now NATO members and Russia's warnings about confrontation and deterioration of relations with the West remained on the level of official announcements and statements.  After a ceremonial raising of the new members' flags, Russia's foreign minister, Sergei V. Lavrov meeting with NATO ministers in Brussels, called NATO's expansion a mistake. ''The presence of American soldiers on our border has created a kind of paranoia in Russia,'' he said, according to Agence-France Press[31].

Hereby, the Baltic states successful case shows that geopolitical situation always matters and there is no final verdict for any state from any country. Though the Baltic states still have security problems and fears from Russia, they are NATO members and can have an impact on NATO's further enlargement, especially towards the East.

---

[1] Richard H. Heindel, Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, and Francis O. Wilcox, “The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate,” The American Journal of International Law 43, 1949

[2] Ronald D. Asmus, “Europe’s Eastern Promise: Rethinking NATO and EU Enlargement,” Foreign Affairs 87:1 (2008): 95,  Eunika Katarzyna Frydrych, The Debate on NATO Expansion, page 18

[4] Goldgeier, James M.  “The U.S. Decision to Enlarge. How, When, Why, and What Next.” The Brookings Review, N.3, 1999.page 21

[5] Zdeněk Kříž, NATO after the End of the Cold War, 2015, page 25

[6] Goldgeier, James M.  “The U.S. Decision to Enlarge. How, When, Why, and What Next.” The Brookings Review, N.3, 1999, page 18

[7] Zdeněk Kříž, NATO after the End of the Cold War, 2015, page 26

[8] Thomas S. Mowle, Review  for "Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade itself for a New Era by Ronald D. Asmus, American Studies International Vol. 41, No. 3 (OCTOBER 2003), pp. 136-137

[9] Braun, Daniel. NATO Enlargement and the Politics of Identity, Centre for International Relations, Queen’s

University Kingston, Ontario, Canada 2007, page 7

[10] Zdeněk Kříž, NATO after the End of the Cold War A Brief History, 2015, page 8

[11] Zdeněk Kříž, NATO after the End of the Cold War A Brief History, 2015, page 10

[12] Robert E. Hunter The European Security and Defense Policy , RAND 2002, page 8

[13] Anand Menon, “ France, NATO and the Limits of Independence”, New York: MACMILLIAN Press INC., 2000, p. 123

[14] Pichler, Lothar. Comparison of the French and German approaches to ESDP and NATO, 2004

[16] Pichler, Lothar. Comparison of the French and German approaches to ESDP and NATO, 2004

[17] Daniel Braun, NATO Enlargement and the Politics of Identity, Centre for International Relations, Queen’s

University Kingston, Ontario, Canada 2007, page 6

[18] Zajedova, Iivi., “The Baltic States' Security and NATO Enlargement, Perspectives”, No. 13, SPECIAL ISSUE: The Balkans, NATO and European Security after the Kosovo War (Winter 1999/2000), page 79

[19] Zajedova, Iivi., “The Baltic States' Security and NATO Enlargement, Perspectives”, No. 13, SPECIAL ISSUE: The Balkans, NATO and European Security after the Kosovo War (Winter 1999/2000), page 84

[20] RFE, 'NATO expansion—How Far, How Fast', 12.02.99

[21] Stephen J. Blank, NATO ENLARGEMENT AND THE BALTIC STATES: WHAT CAN THE GREAT POWERS DO?, 1997, page 28

[22] Stephen J. Blank, NATO ENLARGEMENT AND THE BALTIC STATES: WHAT CAN THE GREAT POWERS DO?, 1997 page 32

[23] Jamestown Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 42, February 14, 2002

[24] Larrabee, F. Stephen . “NATO's Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era, Baltic security”. RAND, 2003, page 60

[25] Larrabee, F. Stephen . “NATO's Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era, Baltic security”. RAND, 2003, page 55

[26] Larrabee, F. Stephen . “NATO's Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era, Baltic security”. RAND, 2003, page 58

[27] Ibid page 59

[28] Ibid page 70

[29] Ibid page 72

[30] Ibid page 76