Part I. The Mobilization of the Israeli Miluim

I n recent years, events taking place in various hotspots of the world demonstrate the importance of quick public mobilization, participation of the militia, and its high level of preparation in responding to aggression.

Alongside the process of rearming and diversification of the RA Armed Forces, the establishment of the militia system, which started in the summer of 2020, continues. Amendments have already been made in “On Defense” [1], “On Territorial Administration” [2], “On Local Self-Government” [3] and other laws, creating legislative bases for the formation and coordination of the militia. In particular, based on the amendments made to the law “On Defense”, the first goal of the militia is to “give the defense of the Republic of Armenia a universal and nationwide character”. 

In this context, the creation of a necessary legal basis for the organization of militia in the Republic of Armenia can be considered a step towards the concept of total defense. The militia is undoubtedly an important, but only an element of the total defense. From the viewpoint of making its own Total Defense System, it is important to study the experience and individual elements of countries with total defense or other similar systems.

Israel Defense Forces

T he first and most common example in discussions about universal defense is the Israel Defense Forces (Tzahal). Moreover, these discussions are usually not free from various manipulative and mythical elements. In recent years, the relatively calm background of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (the last large-scale actions took place in the summer of 2014) created fertile ground for the deepening of those myths in public perceptions. On October 7, 2023, the attack of Hamas hit them significantly: in particular, among the most popular myths about the super-effectiveness of the Iron Dome and the invulnerability of the Israeli Army, in general, were dispelled.

It is noteworthy, that during the spreading of these myths, the circumstance of the technical and tactical low levels of Israel’s opponent was not taken into account. Actually, to strike a painful and unexpected blow on the Israeli army, although not devastating, was enough to be qualitatively a little more prepared and organized than before.

Yet, that is not the problem. The victory of the Israeli Defense Forces at this stage of the conflict is only a matter of time. The most important result of the Hamas operation is that it also exposed the weaknesses of the Israeli army, against the background of which the further actions highlighted the strengths. Therefore, already at this stage, studying the operations of Israel’s Defense Army, it is possible to find useful and working mechanisms in them to localize in your own system.

In this regard, perhaps, the most obvious was the speed of mobilization of the reserve force. Daniel Hagari, Israeli Defense Forces’ spokesman announced on October 9, that 300,000 reservists have been mobilized in 48 hours [4]. Normally, the number of Israeli DF is about 170,000, and such multiplication in such a short time is already impressive. Moreover, it is not just about increasing the number: 300,000 (then another 60,000 [5]) Israeli conscripts are almost immediately ready to perform military tasks. The reason is psychology, put in the doctrinal basis of Tzahal [6] still in its creation.

History and Philosophy of Tzahal

I sraeli Defense Forces was formally established during the War of Independence on May 28, 1948 [7]. Practically, of course, Jewish underground militarized structures were already operating in Palestine even before the war. In June 1948, organizations such as the Haganah, Irgun (Etzel) and Lehi agreed that their armed units should be integrated into Tzahal.

The doctrinal foundations and philosophy of Israeli DF have been shaped taking into account the geopolitical realities. First, it is an acceptance of the fact that Israel is inferior to its neighbors in population and will always have to fight a numerically superior enemy for the foreseeable future. Then, the realization of the existential threat, that is, the neighbors do not have border disputes with Israeli State, but do not accept its right to exist at all. Therefore, Israel must be ready to face wars of destruction. Considering the above-mentioned, as well as geographical and territorial specificities (lack of strategic depth, settlements located close to the front line, lack of natural barriers) it was concluded that Israel cannot even dream of victory by destroying the enemy. Hence, the goal should be to strike the enemy’s armed forces in such a way that they are out of action for as long as possible. Moreover, this strike must be struck as soon as possible, since the war will force the mobilization of a huge percentage of the population, which will simply stop the country’s economy within a few weeks.

The solid logical basis of the military doctrine allowed to show flexibility and adopt to the new challenges of a changing region. Having evolved and changed over the decades, the concept of Tzahal now includes 3 critical components: prevention, disruption and deterrence, which received the name “battle between wars”.

Sadir and Miluim

T he above-mentioned principles and philosophy can gain practical meaning in the presence of a military trained society. To educate such a society, Israel paid great attention to the inclusion of large masses of its population in the army. The law on Defense Service [8] defines two types of mandatory military service in Tzahal: regular service (Sadir) and reserve service (Miluim). As is known both men (for 32 months) and women (for 24 months) are called up for Israeli Army. After the regular service, the reserve service begins, which is also mandatory. Women may be exempt from the duty of defense service due to marital status or health reasons. Men can only be exempted from defense service for health reasons.  

Men up to 41 and women up to 38 are required to go into reserve service. The age limit for combat officers is 46, for some special professions (doctors, technicians, etc.) up to 50. Based on the amendments made in December 2023, the threshold for all the above groups has been increased by one year, in order not to harm IDF’s combat capability during the war against Hamas. After passing the age threshold for the mandatory reserve service, all groups can continue their service on a voluntary basis.  

The Law on Reserve Service [9] defines that a serviceman must participate in military trainings several times a year. The duration of a training depends on the profession and position of a person of military age. The average duration of reserve service is up to 25 days per year (usually less). Based on the law a reservist who is not an officer and performs a non-commanding position can be conscripted for a period of up to 54 days, sergeants and non-commissioned officers up to 70 days, officers up to 84 days, and residents with some special professions up to 108 days.

The aim of these trainings is to improve the knowledge, skills and abilities of enlisted personnel, non-commissioned officers and officers, introduction to the changes (new techniques, new principles, development of practical skills in using weapons) taking place in the defense forces. Furthermore, reservists may be called up in peacetime to participate in military trainings as part of their unit, strengthen the security of the border and important facilities and eliminate the consequences of natural or man-made disasters. That is, besides maintaining the level of combat readiness, reservists often perform routine tasks as well, to ease the burden of military units.

Organization of mobilization in case of hostilities

I n case of hostilities, reservists receive a “Tzav 8” command, which means that a citizen must report to a designated military base within 12 hours. If abroad, the period increases to 48 hours. During the next 12 hours, the reception of weapons, the clarification of orders and instructions, the movement of the unit to the place of the combat task are organized.

According to combat readiness [10], formations and units of Tzahal are divided into permanent readiness formations, first and second-stage reserves. In peacetime, formations and units of permanent readiness are almost completely equipped with personnel, weapons and equipment.  The first-stage reserve is staffed with at least half of the personnel, and almost 100% equipped with weapons and equipment. The second-stage reserve is staffed only with the required number of personnel (about 10-15%) and 80-90% equipped with weapons and equipment.

According to established standards, 6 hours are planned to transfer permanent readiness formations to the “Full” state of combat readiness (including for formations and units on combat duty – 2 hours), for first-line reserve 36 hours, and for second-line reserve 72 hours.

In such short terms, the recruitment of reservists becomes possible through the conscription of mandatory reserve service. Actually, training and integration of reservists does not take few weeks, but a few days at most. The conscript should remember not at best a few years but a maximum of 11 months of data, reaccustom himself not to his term of service, but to the weapon attached to him during periodic military exercises and trainings. 

Besides saving time, Milium performs another important function of a social nature. As it was already mentioned, the reservists participating in military trainings, in order to lighten the burden of temporary units can also perform current tasks, such as patrolling, replacing conscript drivers or mechanics, to relieve the burden on conscript units. In addition to the fact that some tasks are performed by an experienced reservist faster and with better quality, in the meantime, there is a transfer of experience from the more experienced reservist to the younger conscript. The same thing works backwards, when a young conscript, owning for example a new weapon, shares the specifics of its use with a reservist seeing the weapon for the first time. 

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[1] https://www.arlis.am/documentview.aspx?docid=180552
[2] https://www.arlis.am/documentview.aspx?docID=73271
[3] https://www.arlis.am/documentview.aspx?docid=176442
[4] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/id
[5] https://www.afr.com/world/middle-east/israel
[6] https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/history-and
[7] https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-founding
[8] https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/israel-defense
[9] https://he.wikisource.org/wiki/
[10] http://www.iimes.ru/?p=74532