Why does Russia’s rating decrease?

F ollowing the independence of the Republic of Armenian and the victory in the First Artsakh War, the Armenian society perceived Russia as the guarantor of Armenia’s security, main economic and political partner and by the wider circles of the society it was practically the only possible ally. In the last decade, however, it dramatically changed. The perception of Russia as a partner has decreased significantly. At the same time, concerns about threats from Russia have increased. 

Based on the research of the Caucasian Research Resource Center, between 2013-2021 the percentage of those who perceive Russia as the most friendly country in Armenia decreased more than twice, from 83% in 2013 to 35% in 2021. 

It is noteworthy, that despite the sharp decline, Russia maintained its leading position until the 2021 poll, however based on the lates data, it ceded this position to France, which was considered the friendliest country by 36% of the respondents. 



There is a similar situation in the 2018-2023 polls of the International Republican Institute. Russia has lost its position as a political partner in public perceptions (from 78% to 50%). The share of those who consider Russia as an economic (from 11% to 24%) and political (from 15% to 28%) threat has increased significantly. 

*2 answers were accepted during the 2021 IRI survey, and more than 2 in 2018 and in 2023

The reasons for the decline in Russia’s rating in recent years are numerous and are of both objective and subjective nature. The main objective is Moscow’s policy of equality between the parties in the Artsakh conflict, and the resulting problems: arms sales to Azerbaijan, the lack of criticism of Azerbaijani provocations and a clear alliance position during the 2020 Artsakh war. Subjective reasons are of a more diverse and emotional nature.

In this situation, it is not so much the decrease in the rating of Russia that is interesting, but the increase in the ratings of France and the United States at its expense. The simplistic understanding of the reasons for such “transfer”, prevailing in some Russian and Armenian circles, is that even before the change of power in 2018, Western NGOs in Armenia started an anti-Russian propaganda with the quiet consent of the authorities. Actually, this statement does not express the whole picture.    

T here was a severe lack of resources in various fields of public life in Armenia, as well as in a number of other post-Soviet countries after the collapse of the USSR. The situation in Armenia was more complicated due to the Artsakh war and the need to direct scarce resources there. In those conditions, foreign, and first of all Western public organizations and foundations tried to fill the gap in financial and other resources in the spheres of public life. Along with various development programs, they also carried out propaganda of appeal of Western values, however it cannot be claimed that the activities of these NGOs were aimed at exclusively changing the external vector and weakening the positions of the Russian Federation in Armenia. 

Armenian public discourse was not inclined to not only abandon allied relations with Russia but also to look for other allies in general. Besides, the Armenian society had a certain resistance to Western soft power, since, unlike other post-Soviet countries, it had contact with the Armenian colonies of the West during the Soviet years, and conventional “Western values” were not fundamentally new in the Armenian reality.  

Western organizations have been working under these conditions for years. Moreover, to avoid the wrong impression, it is worth noting that the programs and financial support of these organizations have actually been an important stimulus for the development of some sectors of the economy in severe social-economic conditions. For instance, during its 25-year (1998-2022) activity, the Open Society Foundation implemented a total of $36.4 mil. worth projects. A significant part of this, $10 mil. went to support civil society, and the media also received a significant support of $5,6 mil., education and health fields received $3,5 mil. each, arts and culture $1,9 mil., etc. Moreover, support for business had a large share in the programs implemented in all sectors, which significantly contributed to the formation of a positive attitude towards the ideas prompted in parallel. 

The U.S. and EU official funding is even broader, targeted and effective. Since 2004, more than $2,5 bil. has been received from the U.S. through various agencies. A significant part of it was allocated to administration, infrastructure, energy and business fields. Since 2014, more than 1 bil. euros have been invested in the energy, agriculture and transport in the form of loans and grants by the EU. The funds invested since 2009 have led to the creation of at least 3200 new jobs, and have impacted 25,000 small and medium-sized enterprises. The fields financed by the EU also include the science, art, medicine, education and so on. 

Regardless of the framework of the support, as well as of its size and nature, a broad information campaign was also carried out in parallel to the implementation of all western programs, which led to the formation of a positive attitude among the public. 

As for the anti-Russian activity of Western organizations, an indirect work has been carried out in that direction. However, in terms of influence on Russia’s rating, the activity and working style of Russian state and non-governmental organizations and foundations, which in terms of attractiveness and efficiency are significantly inferior to the Western ones, is a bigger problem. 

The reason that the influence of Russian or “pro-Russian” public organizations in Armenia is not great, is not only conditioned by the scarcity of financial flows. The problems also include the low level of organization, lack of common approach, communication and unified strategy. The limitation of the discussed topics is no less problematic: organizations of Russian orientation put emphasis on individual episodes of the general history, ignoring both the current demands of the general public and the opportunities for the future. The few programs of real value are not widely covered and advertised, however, the effective use of the “soft power” implies appropriate information support. All these problems stem from a unique understanding of the concept of “soft power” in Russia and a relatively little experience in its application. 

Recently, there is a tendency among Russian partners to correct the situation: studies and analyzes are carried out regarding the wishes, expectations and needs of the Armenian public. Nevertheless, they are not of the necessary volume and depth in order to talk about the imminent change of the situation, but are more of a cognitive nature. 

The Russian press also creates an unfavorable atmosphere for Russian soft power. During the last 10 years, since the possible signing of the EU-Armenia Association Agreement in 2013, the Russian media regularly accuse Armenia of trying to direct the outward vector to the West. After the unsigned Association Agreement, the reason for that was Electric Yerevan, then after the April War the protests against arms sales to Azerbaijan, the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement signed with the EU in 2017, the Velvet Revolution in 2018 and so on. 

On the one hand it is clear that having the sad experience of Georgia and Ukraine, the Russian media reacts painfully to any episode that may contain danger for Russian influence. On the other hand, it should be taken into account that such reactions at least did not contribute to keeping Ukraine and Georgia in the Russian orbit. Furthermore, the unbalanced and sometimes even offensive positions of the Russian media, experts and Telegram channels further alienate the Armenian public from Russia. 

Overall, Russia currently possesses enough resources in Armenia, including strategic objects, which if used skillfully, will be able to turn the public perceptions in its favor again. A clearer and more decisive security policy, implementation of social programs, closer cooperation in the fields of education, science and culture, showing respect for Armenian culture, history and traditions can be the first steps in this direction.