Moscow faces new challenges

R ussian President Vladimir Putin approved the  new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation on March 31, 2023. It is a strategic planning document, which reflects Russia’s national interests, strategic goals, problems and main directions of foreign policy. The document also describes the current situation in the world from the Russian viewpoint, the current trends and challenges that Moscow faces in foreign policy. The concept defines Russia’s policy based on the regions, in which, of course, the priority is given to the relations with the Near Abroad countries, in other words the post-Soviet territory. The importance of the document is also determined by the fact that it describes the positioning of Russia in international relations in the context of ongoing military operations in Ukraine. 

The previous concept of the foreign policy of Russia was adopted on November 30, 2016, and before that  on July 15, 2008. Unlike the concepts of previous years, in the new concept, for the first time, Russia is mentioned as a “self-sufficient civilization-state” and “the center of the Russian world”.  Such wording is intended to strengthen Russia’s role as an alternative to other civilizations and to emphasize the separation from Western civilization. The document also states that Moscow’s attitude towards other states and interstate associations is determined by the “constructive”, “neutral” or “unfriendly” nature of their policy towards Russia. Thus, the United States is viewed as “the main source of risks for anti-Russian policy and security of the country, international peace, balanced and fair development of humanity”.

The second part of the concept, which follows the “General Provisions”, is titled “The Modern World: Major Trends and Prospects for Development”. The following key theses can be pointed out here:

• The formation of a more equitable multipolar world order is underway.
• The imbalanced model of world development irrevocably remains in the past.
• The role of the power factor in international relations is increasing, conflict areas are expanding in a number of strategically important regions. 
• The risk of collision between major states, including with the participation of nuclear powers, and the probability of such conflicts escalating and growing into a local, regional or global war.

These changes are characterized as “revolutionary” in the concept, whereas the 2016 concept considered the changes taking place in the world to be “profound”, and the main axis of those changes was the increase in the role of the Asia-Pacific region and on the contrary, the decrease in the opportunities of the West to dominate. 

In the new document, although “the Russian Federation does not consider itself an enemy of the West, does not isolate, does not have hostile intentions and is ready for dialogue and cooperation”, the West as stated in the text of the document “the United States and its satellites”, “used the military operations in the Ukraine as a pretext to escalate a long-standing anti-Russian policy and to unleash a new kind of hybrid war”. And in the 2016 document, the main threat for Russia was the international terrorism. It is noteworthy that the new document clearly states: “in response to unfriendly actions of the West, Russia intends to define its right to existence and freedom of development using all means available.” Such wording may imply that Moscow does not exclude the use of its nuclear arsenal if necessary. Earlier the Russian President, commenting on the statements of the West about the use of weapons of mass destruction noted, that Moscow also has various means of destruction: “If the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, we will certainly use all the means at our disposal to protect Russia and our people.”

In the third part of the document “National Interests, Strategic Goals and Key Tasks of the Russian Federation in the Foreign Policy Domain”, the implementation of the following main actions is pointed out for the realization of the strategic goals of the foreign policy:

• Counteraction of anti-Russian activities carried out by foreign states. 
• Establishing good neighborly relations with contiguous states and contributing to the prevention and elimination of tensions and conflicts in their territories. 
• Provision of assistance to Russian allies and partners in promoting shared interests, ensuring their security and sustainable development, irrespective of whether or not the allies and partners receive international recognition or membership of international organizations.
• Unlocking and strengthening the capacity of multilateral regional associations and integration structures with Russia’s participation. 

Comparison with the concepts of foreign policy of the Russian Federation of 2016 and 2008 allows us to conclude that if previously Russia was more inclined to international cooperation in various fields, advocated for the establishment of international security, maintenance of stability, than the new document is more self-centered and is guided by the imperatives of ensuring Russia’s security, identifying and developing the country’s potential in all the fields, strengthening the economy and other imperatives. 

The fourth part of the concept “Foreign Policy Priorities of the Russian Federation” states, that Moscow is intended to give priority attention to: 

• Elimination of the vestiges of domination by the U.S. and other unfriendly states in global affairs. 
• Enhance the capacity and international role of the interstate associations of BRICS, SCO, CIS, EAEU, CSTO and with the strong Russian participation. 
• Activation of the process of international and legal formulation of the state border of the Russian Federation.  
• Supporting allies and partners in ensuring defense and security, suppressing attempts of external interference with their internal affairs. 
• Developing military, military-political and military-technical cooperation with allies and partners. 
• Assistance in the creation and improvement of mechanisms for ensuring regional security and settling crises in regions important to Russia’s interests. 
• Russia’s enhanced role in peacekeeping activities (including within the UN, regional international organizations and parties to conflict), strengthening peacekeeping and anti-crisis potential of the UN and the CSTO.
• Social and economic development of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, EAEU member states, CIS member states that support good-neighbor relations with Russia as well as developing states that pursue a constructive policy towards the Russian Federation.   

It is also noted that the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation can address the tasks of repelling and preventing an armed attack on Russia or its allies, resolving crisis, maintaining/restoring peace.  

It is noteworthy that the 2016 concept expresses Russia’s interest in developing political, economic, cultural and spiritual ties with Ukraine. In the 2008 document, Ukraine is mentioned separately once: “Russia has a negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO, notably to the plans for Ukraine and Georgia to become members of the alliance.” In the 2023 document, Ukraine is not mentioned separately. 

Referring to Georgia, it is stated in the 2016 document, that “Russia is interested in normalizing relations with Georgia in areas where the Georgian side is willing to do the same, with due consideration for the current political realities in the South Caucasus.” In the 2008 concept, besides the context of NATO expansion, there is an indirect reference to Georgia. In particular, Moscow expresses its intention to promote good neighborly relations with bordering states, to assist in eliminating and preventing new hotbeds of conflicts in the neighboring regions. There is no separate mention of Georgia in the new concept either. 

T he 2016 concept notes that Russia actively advocates a political and diplomatic settlement of conflicts in the post-Soviet area, including “to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by working together with other states and based on the principles set forth in joint statements by the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk group and the presidents of Russia, the United States and France.” Taking into account the 44-day war in 2020 and the subsequent developments in the region, as well as Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, there is no reference to Artsakh in the 2023 concept. Actually, in the current situation, Russia avoids mentioning red lines and principles regarding Artsakh. It is noteworthy that there is no separate reference to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the 2008 concept either.    

It is also important to consider the change in Russia’s approach to Europe. In the 2008 concept, the main objective of Russian foreign policy on the European truck was “to create a truly open, democratic system of regional collective security and cooperation, ensuring the unity of the Euro-Atlantic region.” Moscow also emphasized not allowing the reproduction of bloc-based approaches and advocated for the unity of Europe without divisive lines. Considering itself a biggest European State, Russia stood ready to develop cooperation with Europe.  

The contradiction with Europe already appeared in the 2016 document. It is emphasized, that NATO and the European Union continue their geopolitical expansion, the aim of which is to restrain Russia. Despite this, Moscow notes that the EU remains an important trade-economic and foreign political partner. “The Russian Federation is interested in constructive, stable and predictable cooperation with EU countries based on the principles of equality and respect for each other’s interests,” the concept notes. 

If in the previous documents Europe is considered as a partner in many fields and the Russian Federation stands ready to cooperate, then in the 2023 concept Europe is considered as a periphery of Eurasia, which is of course primarily due to the Ukraine conflict and EU sanctions against Russia. The phrase “European part of Eurasia” is found in the document, and Europe is completely excluded from the priority directions of Russian foreign policy. 

The fifth part of the document, “Regional Tracks of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation”, is remarkable that Moscow’s priorities are defined here based on the regions. They are presented in the following order: 

• Near Abroad,
• The Arctic,
• Eurasian continent (China, India),
• The Asia-Pacific region,
• The Islamic world,
• Africa,
• Latin America and the Caribbean,
• European region,
• The U.S. and Anglo-Saxon states,
• Antarctica.

B oth in the previous documents and in the 2023 concept, the main direction of Russia’s foreign policy is the Near Abroad. It is noteworthy that in the 2016 concept instead of this term, the “post-Soviet territory” concept is used and the security of the post-Soviet territory and the resolution of conflicts through political and diplomatic means are especially important. Although “the near abroad” concept is just perceived as a post-Soviet territory, however it may expand its geopolitical significance to include for instance Iran or Turkey.  

In the 2016 document, CIS is followed by the Union State of Russia and Belarus, and in the 2023 concept it is stated that the Russian Federation should give priority attention to “preventing and resolving armed conflicts, ensuring stability in the near abroad, including preventing the instigation of “color revolutions” and other attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia’s allies and partners.” In the new document Belarus is also mentioned only within the Union State framework: “Russia intends to give priority attention… complementarity within the Union State framework.” Both in the 2016 document, as well as in the new concept, the cooperation with Armenia is considered within the CSTO, EAEU, CIS frameworks. By the way, in the 2016 concept, the deepening of integration in the EAEU is emphasized and in the 2023 concept, the CSTO and the deepening of cooperation in the field of defense and security are emphasized. 

In the 2016 concept, Moscow planned to support the establishment of Abkhazia and South Ossetia “as modern democratic states”, while the new document states that Moscow will give attention to the “comprehensive support of the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of Ossetia, promoting the voluntary choice of the peoples of these states in favor of a deeper integration with Russia.” Despite the change in the emphasis, and complications in Russia-West relations caused by the special operations in Ukraine, the Geneva International Discussions on Security and Stability in the Transcaucasia keeps on working, the desired result of which for Moscow is to receive guarantees of the non-use of force from Georgia over Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. The last remote meeting took place on March 22, 2023, and the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin considered  the months-long pause in the negotiation format unacceptable. At the same time, the points related to the cooperation with the West in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were left out of the new concept. The latest joint statement of the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group was adopted on December 7, 2021.

The regional directions section especially emphasizes the priority of cooperation with Asia within the “Great Eurasia” idea’s framework, the intention to cooperate with China and India, which implies that the Asian region may become a key direction for the EAEU, CIS and CSTO.  Russia’s planned relations with the Islamic world are also important. In this direction, the role of Iran, Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt is especially emphasized. 

Thus, unlike the concepts of previous years, where Europe and the United States followed the Near Abroad, here the West has given priority to other regions.

The concept of “ally” appeared in the new Concept of the Russian Foreign Policy, which did not appear either in 2016 or in 2008 concepts of foreign policy. The document emphasizes Russia’s intention to protect allied and partner countries, deepening defense cooperation with them and eliminating obstacles for deepening relations with them. This claim is of particular importance to Armenia from the viewpoint of reinterpreting relations with Russia. The practical application of the provisions on allies in the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation will have a positive impact on Armenian-Russian bilateral relations, will strengthen the role of Russia as an ally of Armenia and will also contribute to the efforts of establishing peace and security in the South Caucasus.  

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[1] The Concept of the Foreign Policy of Russia 2023
[2] The Concept of the Foreign Policy of Russia 2016
[3] The Concept of the Foreign Policy of Russia 2008
[4] Russian President Vladimir Putin’s message of September 21, 2022
[5] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister M. Galuzin’s meeting with the co-chairs of the Geneva International Discussions on Security and Stability in Transcaucasia
[6] Russian Foreign Ministry considers the pause in the Geneva International Discussions unacceptable
[7] OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs joint statement