T urkey was openly engaged in the 44-day war in Artsakh, supporting Azerbaijan in all possible directions: military, political, diplomatic and information, within the logic of a well-known slogan “one nation, two states”.

During the war, the actions of the two countries were mostly in harmony in the field of information, which was noticed during the Tavush events in July 2020.

There was an additional check of the intelligence operation a week or two before the war, when the two countries began to escalate the situation around Armenia artificially, repeating the same theses. Their cooperation in information continued in the post-war period, moreover, it gained legal enforcement through signing a memorandum on creating a Turkish-Azerbaijani media platform.

During this period, with the theses put forward by the Turkish side, Turkey presents “changed” approaches to relations with Armenia, stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, perceptions of its role in the region and the policy of strengthening its presence in the South Caucasus. 

The new Turkish theses directly or indirectly related to Armenia and Artsakh are built on the following ideas:

1. 
   Own involvement in the war,           
   2. New quality role in the region,           
   2.1. “To restore the liberated territories”, the importance “to resettle”,

2.2. “Turkey as a peacekeeper, an advocate of peace establishment”; etc.
3. Circulation of TR achievements after the end of the war

3.1. “Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is solved”
3.2. “Turkey will have a direct land connection with the Turkic world 100 years later”
3.3. “Return of TR to the region”.
4. Development of new anti-Armenian theses as a tool of pressure on Armenia.

1․ Turkey’s involvement in the war

Turkish officials and analysts speak openly about Turkey’s involvement in Azerbaijani victory in war. After the war Ankara began to speak more openly about its impact and participation in the results registered in Artsakh. If before that it was said in the highest level that Turkey “would support Azerbaijan both on the field and at the table”, then in the post-war period, it was said that “Azerbaijan won in the Nagorno-Karabakh war due to Turkey’s active involvement/support”, “Turkey’s support was decisive in the war” and “Turkey’s support prevented possible participation or intervention of other states” [1]. 

Turkey’s participation is also presented indirectly. For instance, publications on the use of Turkish UAVs, which turned into an advertising campaign for Turkish weapons [2].

1. Theses of Turkey’s new quality role in the region

2.1.    Priority theses of restoration and construction of the territories

Turkey strongly emphasizes the restoration of territories, promotion of construction, creation of housing conditions, by being actively involved in that processes [3]. Particular preference is given to the construction of facilities of strategic importance. This approach was emphasized in the statement made by Adil Karaismailoğlu, Turkish Minister of Transport and Infrastructure [4]. Ankara advised Baku first to build the highway connecting Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan at an accelerated pace and only then the more time-consuming railway.

Practical steps are also being taken towards restoration. In particular, Turkish companies were involved in the road construction and primary infrastructures’ construction/restoration since the first day. Azerbaijan, in turn, prefers Turkish companies in state tenders for reconstruction [5]. In addition, the Turkish side works to attract investments in the restoration of territories and to create the necessary propaganda-ideological basis for it. For this purpose, Turkey-Azerbaijan Economic Cooperation Council of the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK) adjunct to the Turkish Government convened a special meeting in February this year [6]. The chairman of the council made a remarkable observation, that “the restoration of the liberated territories” of Nagorno-Karabakh should be their responsibility and not a burden.

Turkey’s special emphasis on this role should be observed in several dimensions:

1. In the logic of the final settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: that is, to resettle those territories with Azeris (Turks) as soon as possible, to gradually gain a demographic advantage and to surround the Armenians of Artsakh with a Turkic element.

The idea of resettlement is being promoted at the level of the Turkish president. Erdogan stated at the Turkic Council Summit, that Turkey’s next priority after the rehabilitation of infrastructure is “the return of refugees to their homes” [8].

1. Economic. Besides profits, Turkey is strengthening its capital presence in Azerbaijan.
2. Rooting the perception of Turkey as a big brother in Azerbaijani society. Other tools are also used in this direction, such as medical assistance to the wounded in the war, social assistance to the families of the victims, etc.

2.2. Theses of being a guarantor of peace and stability establishment in the region

Turkish military presence at the Aghdam ceasefire monitoring center is emphasized in the context of this thesis, which will also “follow the stability established by Turkey’s efforts” [9]. On March 13, presenting details from a telephone conversation with Russian President about this center, Turkish President R. T. Erdogan noted: “Turkey will provide any necessary investment and support in a new era of stability and peace in the region”. 

Furthermore, Turkey’s presence/role in the region is considered equal to Russia’s role [11].

We can also consider Turkey’s proposal to create a “3+3” or “6” platform within the framework of the thesis of Ankara’s role in establishing and maintaining peace in the region. This project is presented as the only way of economic development and prosperity for all the countries of the region, which will lead to lasting peace and stability. It should be noted that Armenia is presented as a destructive party on the way to “peace building”, which unlike the regional countries responding positively to the project, didn’t respond to it [12].

We can also consider the statements of Turkish officials on the normalization of relations with Armenia within the framework of peace thesis, which mainly have a conditional context. For instance, “if Armenia get a head count”, “if it learns lessons”, “if it fulfills its obligations”, “if it takes positive steps”, then Turkey can respond positively and can normalize relations with Armenia, coordinating with Azerbaijan [13].

1. Theses of Turkey’s achievements as a result of the war

3.1 Turkey presents at a state and expert level that the conflict is solved: “Azerbaijan has put an end to 30 years of injustice” and “has liberated the occupied territories”. The terms “territory under the control of Russian peacekeepers” or “places, where Russian peacekeepers are deployed” are used for the territories of Artsakh under Armenian control.

Erdogan pointed out the ultimate goal of Turkey, stating that the conflict is solved: “We want to create conditions that will ensure coexistence in Nagorno-Karabakh without the need for peacekeeping forces or observation activities”.

Moreover, the authorities use this thesis in Turkey’s domestic political discourse to rebuke the opposition. The main point is that while the opposition opposes actions outside the country, Turkey resolved the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by supporting Azerbaijan and connected with the Turkic world becoming one of the main role-players in the region. 

3.2. Thesis of establishing a direct connection between Turkey and the Turkic world

T urkey considers the point on unblocking of economic and transportation routes of the trilateral declaration signed on November 9, 2020 to be one of the most significant achievements. According to the Turkish commentary, direct connect with the Turkic world was restored over 100 years later [15]. “Direct connect” term refers to infrastructures connecting Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan through the territory of Armenia, which is called “Nakhichevan corridor” in Turkish. Turkey is putting forward the proposal of creating “the platform of 6” for its implementation.

3.3.   Thesis of Turkey’s return to the South Caucasus

“Turkey has returned to the South Caucasus with a victory in Artsakh” [16] and as Turkish expert M. Yarar notes, from now on, the region has turned from a Turkish zone of interest into a zone of influence [17].

Turkish high-ranking officials speak openly about the increase of Turkey’s role in the region, making it also a political “subject of trade” for some foreign role-players, particularly in relations with the EU. This policy is reflected in the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement, in response to the decision on Turkey made during the EU Leaders Summit on March 25-26. The following remarkable observation was made in this statement about Ankara’s role in the region: “Turkey will continue to make efforts to resolve regional issues, such as in Libya, Syria and the South Caucasus. Cooperation with the EU in these issues will benefit the strengthening of regional peace and stability and the promotion of both sides’ common interests”.

1. Anti-Armenian theses, as well as the theses being developed against Armenia

4.1. Thesis of the massacres against Turks committed by Armenians 

Turkey pays a special attention to the topic on “Azerbaijani genocide” and “Azerbaijani massacres”. In 2021, apart from the events in Khojaly, Ankara recalled on a larger scale the victims of the “massacres committed against Azerbaijani Turks by Armenians in 1918” [19]. They are also trying to add the missile attack on Ganja to this series. Referring to the rocket attack on Ganja, Head of the Public Relations Department of the Presidential Administration of Turkey F. Altun described it as a war crime and a crime against humanity [20]. This is how a perception is formed that “the hatred and crimes committed against Turks by Armenians” are continuous.

It should be noted that such a perception may be facilitated by the thesis developed over the years that the Armenians have massacred Turks and Muslims, to deny the Armenian Genocide.

• Thesis of the “barbarities of Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh”

During the months following the Artsakh war, Turkish state and pro-government media outlets visited the occupied territories of Artsakh, including Aghdam, and presented the destruction as proof of Armenians’ barbarism [20]. Turkish President addressed this issue, accusing Armenians of destroying not only mosques but also churches [21].

In parallel to this rhetoric, state institutions take practical steps to capitalize on the accusations against Armenia. On April 15, the Human Rights Inquiry Committee of Turkey adopted a report on “Armenia’s violations in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War” [22].

To sum up the above-mentioned, it should be noted that though Turkey has reduced its active anti-Armenian propaganda during the war, made some changes and has applied for the position of a peace-builder in the region, it continues hostile attitude and policy towards Armenia and the Armenian people.

A vivid example of this contradiction is the above-mentioned unilateral initiative of Turkish Mejilis, where the Armenian side is accused of committing war crimes, while turning a blind eye to Azerbaijan’s war crimes.

The fact of harmonization of policy and actions between Turkey and Azerbaijan in most important issues is a unique proof of such an attitude towards Armenia. In the field of information, it was clearly seen in R. T. Erdogan’s speech made on April 26, after Biden’s statement recognizing the Armenian Genocide, where he presented some of Azerbaijani anti-Armenian theses alongside Turkish theses denying the Armenian Genocide.

It should also be noted that Ankara’s path of harmonization of policy and actions by the Turkish-Azerbaijani example also shows a clear tendency to expand both sectorally and geographically, covering the whole “Turkic world”.

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[1] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7   
[2] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
[3] https://www.milliyet.com.tr/ekonomi/karabagin-y      
[4] https://www.yenisafak.com/ekonomi/bakan-kara
[5] https://www.trthaber.com/haber/azerbaycan/kar
[6] 1, 2
[7] https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/deik-baskani-
[8]  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_9Jic4ECB         
[9] https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/disisleri-bakani
[10] https://t.me/RTErdogan/11         
[11] https://apa.az/ru/vneshnyaya-politika-azerbaydj
[12] 1, 2          
[13] https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/cavusoglund      
[14] https://t.me/RTErdogan/11         
[15] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5         
[16] 1, 2          
[17] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YrC47kUfA          
[18] https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-120_-ab-devlet-ve-
[19]  1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
[20] 1, 2          
[21] 1, 2, 3, 5  
[22] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_9Jic4ECB        
[23] 1, 2