Russia’s Official Response to the Resumption of the Artsakh War
6 m. | 2020-09-30T he Artsakh war resumed early in the morning of September 27, immediately caught the attention of the international community. Different countries and international organizations hurried to make relevant statements. In this context, the official response of Russia is especially important due to a combination of the following circumstances:
- Russia is the CSTO military-political ally of Armenia and at the same time has warm relations with Azerbaijan;
- Is a Co-Chair country of the OSCE Minsk Group dealing with the Artsakh conflict (together with France and the USA);
- Has an indisputable influence in Transcaucasia.
It’s not accidental, that in case of clashes (2014 July-August tensions in the Tavush region, April 2016 four-day war, July 2020 battles again in Tavush) Russia actively intervenes and besides mere statements, enters into practical contact with the conflicting sides. The conflicting sides also acknowledge Russia’s indisputable influence and immediately get in touch with the official Moscow.
Russia’s response to the conflict’s outbreak was revealed in a) an official statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, b) official telephone conversations between President V. Putin and Foreign Affairs minister S. Lavrov.
As in the days of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border tensions in Tavush region in July, this time also Russia’s response has two dimensions: a) official attitude to the current situation and negotiations with the conflicting sides, b) discussion of the issue with Turkey.
Negotiations with the conflicting sides
As during the July tensions, this time as well Russia’s official attitude to the aggravation of the situation can be presented in the following brief points:
- Concern over the aggravation of the situation
- Call for an immediate cessation of hostilities
- Willingness to contribute to de-escalation and practical efforts in that direction
Thus, it is stated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement of September 27: “According to the available information, the situation in the zone of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has sharply deteriorated. Intense shelling is going on along the contact line from both sides. There are reports on losses. We call on the sides to immediately cease fire and start negotiations for the stabilization of the situation” [1].
On the same day, the Russian President had a telephone conversation with the RA Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, during which the sharp aggravation of the situation in the zone of Artsakh conflict was discussed. The official website of the Kremlin reports: “The Russian side expressed serious concern over the resumption of large-scale armed clashes. It was noted that now it is important to take all the necessary efforts to prevent further escalation of the confrontation, and most importantly, it is necessary to stop military operations” [2].
On the same day, Foreign Minister S. Lavrov had separate telephone conversations with Z. Mnatsakanyan and J. Bayramov, discussing the situation in the zone of Artsakh conflict. Based on the official website of the ministry, S. Lavrov exressed a serious concern over the ongoing large-scale hostilities on the line of contact and over the incoming information about the killed and wounded. The need for an early ceasefire was emphasized. It was noted that Russia together with other Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, will continue to undertake mediation efforts aimed at stabilizing the situation [3].
The issue on the Russian-Turkish agenda
A s in the days of the Tavush tensions, Turkey is currently the only country in the world providing unconditional support to Azerbaijan. This support is not limited only to the diplomatic and information spheres. It is also clearly manifested in the military sphere with the supply of Turkish weapons to the Azerbaijani Army, by sending Turkish specialists using these weapons to Azerbaijan, as well as transferring mercenaries from the Middle East and their involvement in hostilities.
The combination of the above mentioned actions allows us to view Turkey as a side of the Artsakh conflict. Such a perception is becoming more and more entrenched both on the Armenian side and in the international community. The President of the Republic of Artsakh Arayik Harutyunyan made a clear statement about it at the press conferences on September 27 and 28. As for Turkey, it not only doesn’t hide, but also openly states that he is an Artsakh conflict side.
That’s the reason, why any border escalation becomes an issue on the agenda of Russian-Turkish relations. On September 27, there was a telephone conversation between Russian and Turkish Foreign Ministers S. Lavrov and M. Cavusoglu, during which, according to the Russian official statement, the need for an immediate ceasefire and stabilization of the situation on the contact line was stressed. Condolences were expressed to the families and friends of the victims [4].
Apparently, this time the Russian side unlike the Tavush tensions, refrained from asserting the inadmissibility of any foreign intervention in the conflict. Only the Chairwoman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly [5] Valentina Matviyenko called on all the responsible international forces to refrain from interfering in the situation [6].
The reason is that the Turkish intervention in the Artsakh conflict is already a reality. If previously the relevant statements had a preventive signature, today they are meaningless at all. Therefore, it remains only the effective counteraction to the Turkish destructive actions.
[1] Заявление МИД России относительно обострения ситуации в зоне нагорно-карабахского конфликта
[2] Телефонный разговор с Премьер-министром Армении Николом Пашиняном
[3] О телефонном разговоре Министра иностранных дел России С.В. Лаврова с Министром иностранных дел Армении З.Г.Мнацаканяном ; О телефонном разговоре Министра иностранных дел России С.В.Лаврова с Министром иностранных дел Азербайджана Д.А.Байрамовым
[4] О телефонном разговоре Министра иностранных дел России С.В. Лаврова с Министром иностранных дел Турции М.Чавушоглу
[5] The Upper House of the Russian Parliament