T he result of the US presidential election on November 5 surprised many. Not all countries, including the US allies, were ready to work with the Republican administration, so when it became known that Donald Trump was returning to the White House, many began to revise their approaches to adapt them to the possible future foreign policy of the US president. Predictions about it are mainly based on the statements of Trump’s team during the pre-election period, as well as post-election developments and contacts. Despite this, Donald Trump is considered an unpredictable politician. As a businessman, the newly elected US president can act according to the dictates of the moment and from the point of view of securing a “profitable deal”. Even in Congress, Trump will not face significant obstacles in advancing his policies, as the Republican Party is in the majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives.

As in his first presidency, Trump will once again enter the White House with the slogan “America First”. This means that the US will significantly reduce its presence in multiple regions, and cut funding to various states, international organizations, and US organizations operating abroad. Meanwhile, over the next 4 years, the US will focus on countering China’s economic threat in particular. American experts, however, claim that if the US pursues an “isolation” policy, it will not only lose its status as a world leader but also make room for other states, including China.

Trump’s victory was not so unexpected for the European Union. A few months before the US election there was already talk in the European Union of a possible change in Washington’s policy in the event of Trump’s election and the need to have a clear strategy to face the new challenges arising. Europe believes that Trump’s “America First” philosophy contradicts US-EU relations and the logic of a “rules-based” world order.

There is a widespread opinion in Europe, that although dialogue with the future Trump administration is necessary, the EU should not rely on the US, especially in defense and security. Thus, the need to achieve “strategic autonomy” emerged. At the same time, many complain that Europe only talks about it and does not take any significant actions to reduce dependence on the US, at least in strategic areas. First of all, it is about increasing military spending. Many political and expert circles express confidence that the US will continue “to provide a security umbrella” for Europe, if Europe itself takes serious steps for its security and presents “beneficial offers” for the US, especially on strengthening NATO’s European wing.

In this regard, Europe’s primary focus is the ongoing war in Ukraine. If Trump implements his “promises”, Ukraine may lose the military and financial support it received from Joe Biden’s administration. At the same time, many are concerned that solutions could be imposed on Ukraine that would mean defeat and territorial losses. Therefore, the European Union can increase financial and military support to Kyiv at the expense of revenues from the frozen assets of Russia. On the one hand, it will ease the financial burden of the US, on the other hand, it will not push Trump to rush to end the conflict. The European Union may offer the US to share the burden of support to Ukraine, taking the financial component and leaving the military part to Washington. Furthermore, the EU should be able to develop a joint strategy on Ukraine together with Washington and Kyiv to act as a party in future negotiations on Ukraine, especially when the Ukrainian side has expressed its willingness to end the war.

In addition, Europe needs unity. This applies to issues related to Ukraine, domestic issues, and foreign policy. Despite the efforts of France and Germany, European countries are far from unity today, but for the upcoming dialogue with the US, the EU must be ready to act from a strong position. Despite the lack of unity on many issues, many EU leaders seem to agree that regardless of US policy, Europe should continue to support Ukraine, as the Union’s security directly depends on it.
Since December, the European Commission has been working with new staff. Before taking office, Kaja Kallas, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, expressed skepticism about the likelihood of the US adopting a policy of “isolation” under Trump. According to her, Europe should be able to show the US the Russia-China-Iran-North Korea ties, and its importance for Washington in confronting these countries. Kallas expressed confidence that NATO should continue to play a leading role in Europe’s defense. At the same time, she says that the EU should make a more serious contribution to ensuring its security.

South Caucasus

N ew geopolitical realities, active military operations in neighboring regions, potential shifts in the foreign policies of the US and the European Union force the countries of the South Caucasus to review their foreign policy and reposition themselves.
There is some fear, that the US and the European Union, due to internal problems on the one hand, and changes in foreign policy priorities on the other, may weaken their involvement in the region. The pointing of priorities during the pre-election campaign shows that the South Caucasus will occupy a low position in the scope of Trump’s foreign policy interests. At the same time, the US policy towards Iran will be tougher, as a result of which the role of Azerbaijan will increase for Washington, and at the same time, Armenia-Iran relations may be somewhat limited. And the disruption of Iran’s position in the region can weaken its influence in restraining Azerbaijan and ensuring stability in the South Caucasus.

Unlike the Biden administration, which emphasized democracy, the Trump administration will emphasize the economy, potentially increasing Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s influence. If Trump fulfills his promise to end the war in Ukraine, this will strengthen Russia’s position in the South Caucasus.

Despite such predictions, new realities open up new opportunities as well. Armenia and the USA reached a new milestone in bilateral relations in 2024. In June, the parties decided to transition from strategic dialogue to strategic partnership. The document fixing it is ready, and it will be effective to sign it with the new US administration. On the one hand, it will mean that Armenia is ready to cooperate no less actively with the Republican administration, and on the other hand, it will give a new impetus to cooperation and it will increase the importance of Armenia for the Trump administration. Nevertheless, it is possible, that the document will be signed by January 20, with the Democratic administration, which will mean that there is a perception in Armenia that the region will be outside the immediate priorities of the Republicans, and the process of signing the document under Trump may be delayed. Therefore, in this regard, Yerevan has still a lot of work to do, if we consider that the new US administration will need a lot of time to clarify its foreign policy. That time should be used to increase Washington’s interest in Armenia. Perhaps, the first steps in this direction have been taken, in particular, the meeting between Prime Minister Pashinyan and newly-elected President Trump held in Paris on December 8, which was preceded by their telephone conversation on November 16. It is also important to take into account the establishment and activation of contacts with pro-Armenian officials in the emerging Trump administration. Although democracy may be relegated to the background for the Republicans, the latter also value Christianity. Trump’s post about Artsakh and his promise to protect the persecuted Christians during the pre-election period were not accidental. Therefore, this idea should also be promoted in the agenda of bilateral relations. To avoid a setback in Armenian-American relations and to enrich the bilateral partnership, the Armenian side should show initiative and present to Trump, guided by the businessman’s philosophy, beneficial proposals for the United States, including in the field of economy. At the same time, Armenia should be ready for various scenarios of changes in the situation in the region, which will depend on geopolitical developments.

Regarding Armenia-EU relations, there is still much to be done in this area. While the EU’s priorities may shift, Brussels should continue to recognize the strategic importance of maintaining its presence in the region. In this context, it is important to sustain efforts to enhance Armenia’s resilience, as highlighted during the high-level joint meeting in the Armenia-EU-USA format on April 5, 2024. Another important milestone is the new Armenia-EU partnership agenda, which comes to supplement the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement. It is necessary to continue the work in the directions already outlined, such as the start of negotiations on the liberalization of visas and the provision of support to Armenia through the European Peace Facility. It is important that in the future the European Union’s 27 member states continue to maintain a consensus on deepening relations with Armenia. Another issue on the agenda is the maintenance and expansion of the European Union’s observation mission in Armenia, which today is an important component for the security of Armenia’s borders and against which Azerbaijan regularly opposes. Along with the deepening of relations with the European Union, the work towards giving new meaning to the ties with individual EU countries should also be considered. It is possible to consider the possibility of raising the relations with France to the level of strategic alliance, and the activation of cooperation with Germany, Greece, Cyprus, especially in the defense field.

Unlike Armenia, Georgia-West relations are quite tense today. Trump’s victory in the elections was perceived quite positively in Georgia. They hope that after January 20 the situation in Georgia-West relations will change, and Tbilisi will be able to agree with Donald Trump more easily. In Georgia, they believe that US pressure related to democratic reforms will decrease. Furthermore, the stances of the Republicans and the “Georgian Dream” on internal and social policy are close, which can also simplify the dialogue between Washington and Tbilisi. Although Georgia is a key ally for the US in the region, given Trump’s lack of interest in maintaining the same level of relations with all allies, it is unclear where Georgia will rank on his administration’s list of priorities. Trump has repeatedly hinted at cutting funding for programs that “do not clearly and demonstrably benefit US interests”. At the same time, the US may be interested in maintaining influence in Georgia to counter China’s growing influence in Tbilisi.
Azerbaijan was also optimistically waiting for Trump to be elected. Ilham Aliyev noted that during Trump’s previous tenure, the US and Azerbaijan were able to cooperate effectively. In the pre-election period, Baku interpreted Trump’s statement regarding Artsakh and the telephone conversation with the Catholicos of the Great House of Cilicia as pre-election steps. Azerbaijan also noted that relations with the Republican administration will be easier to build, also because “negative events” took place during Biden’s tenure, especially in the last year. It cannot be excluded that as a result of the targeted work in Yerevan, the elected figures in Trump’s future administration may put pressure on the US president to tighten the policy towards Baku. As for the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, it can be assumed that Trump can use the signing of the peace agreement as a personal success if the US can act as a mediator or a platform provider. It would also be in line with Trump’s policy of ending conflict.
In summary, the policy of the future Trump administration in the South Caucasus is not clear. At the same time, the region can be expected not to be on Washington’s priority list in the next four years. However, given Trump’s “unpredictability,” one should wait for his administration’s foreign policy actions after January 20.